{"title":"美国政治-军事-工业综合体","authors":"J. Alic","doi":"10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1870","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins.\n The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage.\n The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. If they do not prevail on a particular issue, service leaders expect to outwait their opponents; if they lose one battle over money or some cherished weapon system, they anticipate winning the next.","PeriodicalId":203278,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The U.S. Politico–Military–Industrial Complex\",\"authors\":\"J. Alic\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1870\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins.\\n The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage.\\n The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
三大军种——陆军、海军和空军——构成了美国政治-军事-工业综合体的核心。他们主导着价值数十亿美元的武器系统的决策以及这些系统所要体现的作战概念。军队需要私人公司来实现他们对新武器的设想,因为政府在工程设计和开发方面的能力有限,生产设施也有限。经营一家成功的国防企业意味着给军方提供他们想要的,或者他们认为他们想要的,无论这在技术和操作上是否合理;因此,行业迎合服务的观点,虽然它试图影响他们,但主要是在边缘。复杂的政治动态发生在两个主要领域,只是松散耦合。第一个问题主要在国防部内部。这是各军种之间、各军种之间、各军种之间、个别或集体与五角大楼文职人员之间发生冲突和讨价还价的主要场所。这里发生的大部分事情都不让外人知道。服务领导者通常寻求解决内部分歧;目标是在文职官员和广大公众面前形成统一战线,尽管并非总是能够实现。第二个领域延伸到政府的其他部门,主要是国会及其多个委员会和小组委员会,以及白宫,强大的管理和预算办公室(Office of Management and Budget)和其他政策杠杆来源的所在地。整个建筑群是冷战的产物,几十年来没有太大变化。反复进行结构调整和改革的努力收效甚微。最主要的原因是,在长期沉浸于一般保守的组织文化之后,军事领导人和高级军官通常在官僚斗争中占据上风。他们认为军方在武器选择上的观点——经验丰富的专业人士的观点——应该优先于平民的观点,无论是五角大楼任命的官员和他们的工作人员,民选官员,还是外部专家。他们通常占上风,因为在国防部文职部门和其他地方影响政策的职位上,很少有政治任命的人能拥有类似的权威。如果他们不能在某一特定问题上取得胜利,军队领导人希望比对手等待得更久;如果他们在金钱或某些珍贵的武器系统上输掉了一场战斗,他们预计会赢得下一场战斗。
The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins.
The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage.
The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. If they do not prevail on a particular issue, service leaders expect to outwait their opponents; if they lose one battle over money or some cherished weapon system, they anticipate winning the next.