态度心理学与美德认识论

A. Tanesini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

美德伦理学家和认识论家普遍认为,美德和罪恶是真实的心理状态或特征,可以进行实证研究。然而,对于可能发挥这一作用的心理构念,人们并没有达成一致。本章介绍了态度心理学的工具,在作者看来,它提供了一个理论框架,适合于理解那些在第二章中被描述为认知代理缺陷的智力缺陷。这种方法从情感、动机和认知三个方面揭示了本书所审视的恶习。本章概述了态度心理学中的关键概念,包括态度作为对其对象的总结性评价。它证明了态度是智力美德和邪恶的因果基础。最后,本文阐述了对该框架的各种反对意见,并简要阐述了情境主义对美德认识论的批评所提出的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Attitude Psychology and Virtue Epistemology
Virtue ethicists and epistemologists have generally presumed that virtue and vices are real psychological states or traits amenable to empirical study. There is, however, no agreement on the psychological constructs that may play this role. This chapter introduces the apparatus of attitude psychology that, in the author’s view, supplies a theoretical framework suitable to understand those intellectual vices which in Chapter 2 have been described as defects in epistemic agency. The approach throws light on the affective, motivational, and cognitive dimensions of the vices which are under scrutiny in this book. The chapter provides an overview of key concepts in attitude psychology including that of an attitude as a summary evaluation of its object. It makes a case that attitudes are the causal bases of intellectual virtues and vices. It concludes by addressing various objections to the framework and briefly addresses the questions raised by the situationist criticism of virtue epistemology.
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