半竞争中介网络中的纳什社会福利优化

2019 IEEE International Symposium on INnovations in Intelligent SysTems and Applications (INISTA) Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI:10.1109/INISTA.2019.8778270

A. Bădică, C. Bǎdicǎ, Ion Buligiu, L. Ciora, M. Ganzha, M. Ivanović, M. Paprzycki

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们最近提出了一个半竞争性中介网络中集体盈利能力的数学模型。在这项工作中，我们感兴趣的是确定网络参与者的最优定价策略。利用纳什社会福利函数定义了优化准则。我们基于非线性凸数学优化给出了这些策略存在性的理论结果和计算实验结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Optimizing Nash Social Welfare in Semi-Competitive Intermediation Networks

We have recently proposed a mathematical model of collective profitability, in semi-competitive intermediation networks. In this work, we are interested in determining optimal pricing strategies of network participants. The optimization criterion is defined using the Nash social welfare function. We provide theoretical results of existence of such strategies, as well as computational experimental results, based on nonlinear convex mathematical optimization.

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2019 IEEE International Symposium on INnovations in Intelligent SysTems and Applications (INISTA)

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