安全博弈论:从部署的应用程序中学到的经验

Milind Tambe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济或政治要地、交通或其他基础设施要地的安全是全世界关注的关键问题,特别是在恐怖主义威胁的情况下。有限的安全资源无法在任何时候实现全面的安全覆盖;相反,必须明智地部署这些有限的资源,考虑到需要安全覆盖的目标的优先级差异、对手对安全态势的反应以及所面临的对手类型的潜在不确定性。博弈论非常适合于安全资源分配和调度问题的对抗性推理。将问题视为贝叶斯Stackelberg游戏,我们开发了新的算法来有效地解决此类游戏,以提供随机巡逻或检查策略:因此,我们可以避免可预测性并解决这些安全调度问题中的规模扩大问题,解决人类调度的关键弱点。我们的算法现在部署在多个应用程序中。ARMOR是我们的第一个博弈论应用程序,自2007年以来已在洛杉矶国际机场(LAX)部署,用于随机设置进入机场道路上的检查站和机场航站楼内的警犬巡逻路线。IRIS是我们的第二个应用程序,是一个博弈论的调度程序,用于随机部署联邦空军元帅(FAMS),需要在底层算法中进行大规模扩展;IRIS自2009年开始使用。类似地,波士顿为一个名为PROTECT的系统部署了一套新的算法,用于随机安排美国海岸警卫队的巡逻;PROTECT计划在未来部署在更多地点,而美国运输安全管理局(TSA)正在评估是否在全国部署GUARDS。这些应用程序正在引导现实世界的应用启发研究,以扩展到大规模问题,处理重大的对抗性不确定性,处理人类对手的有限理性,以及其他基本挑战。本讲座将概述我们的算法,主要研究成果和从这些应用中吸取的经验教训。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Game Theory for Security: Lessons Learned from Deployed Applications
Security at major locations of economic or political importance or transportation or other infrastructure is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times; instead, these limited resources must be deployed intelligently taking into account differences in priorities of targets requiring security coverage, the responses of the adversaries to the security posture and potential uncertainty over the types of adversaries faced. Game theory is well-suited to adversarial reasoning for security resource allocation and scheduling problems. Casting the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms for efficiently solving such games to provide randomized patrolling or inspection strategies: we can thus avoid predictability and address scale-up in these security scheduling problems, addressing key weaknesses of human scheduling. Our algorithms are now deployed in multiple applications. ARMOR, our first game theoretic application, has been deployed at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) since 2007 to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. IRIS, our second application, is a game-theoretic scheduler for randomized deployment of the Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) requiring significant scale-up in underlying algorithms; IRIS has been in use since 2009. Similarly, a new set of algorithms are deployed in Boston for a system called PROTECT for randomizing US coast guard patrolling; PROTECT is intended to be deployed at more locations in the future, and GUARDS is under evaluation for national deployment by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). These applications are leading to real-world use-inspired research in scaling up to large-scale problems, handling significant adversarial uncertainty, dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries, and other fundamental challenges. This talk will outline our algorithms, key research results and lessons learned from these applications.
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