Ahmed H. Anwar, C. Kamhoua, Nandi O. Leslie, Christopher Kiekintveld
{"title":"网络欺骗攻击图上的蜜罐分配博弈","authors":"Ahmed H. Anwar, C. Kamhoua, Nandi O. Leslie, Christopher Kiekintveld","doi":"10.1002/9781119723950.ch4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we introduce a cyber deception defense approach and propose a scalable allocation algorithm to place honeypots over an attack graph. We formulate a two‐person zero‐sum strategic game between the network defender and an attacker. The developed game model captures the network topology and its characteristics. The game also counts for the cost associated with the defense action and the attack cost. Nash equilibrium defense strategies are analytically characterized and studied for a special game. The complexity of the general game is discussed and a scalable algorithm is proposed to overcome the game complexity. This chapter extends the model to a dynamic game formulation to better understand game evolution with players' actions. Finally, numerical results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed cyber deception approach.","PeriodicalId":332247,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Honeypot Allocation Games over Attack Graphs for Cyber Deception\",\"authors\":\"Ahmed H. Anwar, C. Kamhoua, Nandi O. Leslie, Christopher Kiekintveld\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/9781119723950.ch4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this chapter, we introduce a cyber deception defense approach and propose a scalable allocation algorithm to place honeypots over an attack graph. We formulate a two‐person zero‐sum strategic game between the network defender and an attacker. The developed game model captures the network topology and its characteristics. The game also counts for the cost associated with the defense action and the attack cost. Nash equilibrium defense strategies are analytically characterized and studied for a special game. The complexity of the general game is discussed and a scalable algorithm is proposed to overcome the game complexity. This chapter extends the model to a dynamic game formulation to better understand game evolution with players' actions. Finally, numerical results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed cyber deception approach.\",\"PeriodicalId\":332247,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119723950.ch4\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119723950.ch4","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Honeypot Allocation Games over Attack Graphs for Cyber Deception
In this chapter, we introduce a cyber deception defense approach and propose a scalable allocation algorithm to place honeypots over an attack graph. We formulate a two‐person zero‐sum strategic game between the network defender and an attacker. The developed game model captures the network topology and its characteristics. The game also counts for the cost associated with the defense action and the attack cost. Nash equilibrium defense strategies are analytically characterized and studied for a special game. The complexity of the general game is discussed and a scalable algorithm is proposed to overcome the game complexity. This chapter extends the model to a dynamic game formulation to better understand game evolution with players' actions. Finally, numerical results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed cyber deception approach.