面向UAS流量管理系统的隐私保护认证框架

Anas Alsoliman, Abdulrahman Bin Rabiah, M. Levorato
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引用次数: 4

摘要

2015年,美国联邦航空管理局(FAA)宣布通过一种名为UAS交通管理(UTM)的交通管理系统将无人机(UAV)整合到国家空域,该交通管理系统专门用于无人机系统(UAS),以支持先进的无人机操作,如自主和超视距(BVLOS)飞行任务。UTM结合了一个名为Remote ID的识别框架,该框架要求所有无人机操作员在飞行过程中持续识别自己。然而,该框架的当前版本缺乏安全功能,其设计引起了无人机运营商对隐私的担忧。本文扩展了远程ID框架,加入了一个匿名验证飞行无人机真实性的隐私保护认证框架。此外,该框架在不透露其操作员身份和整个飞行路径的情况下验证无人机的飞行许可,同时在发生争议的情况下保持任何识别信息可供当局访问。为了满足提出的安全和隐私要求,将无人机的飞行计划表示为一系列航路点,并将其转换为本地化的无人机轨迹,从而创建一组连续的飞行区域,每个飞行区域都有自己的飞行许可。该框架利用boneh - gentry - lynn - shachham (BGLS)数字签名方案将每个区域信息签名并转换为飞行许可,并将一组签名聚合为单个签名,以及用于构建远程id消息的附加属性,该消息用于匿名验证飞行无人机。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Privacy-Preserving Authentication Framework for UAS Traffic Management Systems
In 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) into the national airspace via a traffic management system – called UAS Traffic Management (UTM) – dedicated to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to support advanced UAV operations such as autonomous and beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) flight missions. The UTM incorporates an identification framework called Remote ID which mandates all UAS operators to continuously identify themselves while on flight. However, the current version of the framework lacks security features and its design has raised privacy concerns among UAS operators. This paper extends the Remote ID framework to include a Privacy-Preserving Authentication Framework that anonymously verifies the authenticity of flying UAVs. Moreover, the framework authenticates the UAV’s flight permissions without revealing neither the identity of its operator nor its entire flight path, while at the same time keeping any identifying information accessible to the authorities in case of a dispute. To satisfy the proposed security and privacy requirements, a UAV’s flight plan that is represented as a series of waypoints is transformed into localized UAV trajectories which create a set of contiguous flight zones, each with its own flight permission. This framework utilizes the Boneh–Gentry-Lynn–Shacham (BGLS) digital signature scheme to sign and transform each zone information into a flight permission and aggregate a set of signatures into a single signature along with additional attributes used to construct a Remote-ID message that anonymously authenticates flying UAVs.
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