在一个安全、协作的环境中,理解在可变可观察性下的制裁

Hongying Du, Bennett Narron, Nirav Ajmeri, E. Berglund, J. Doyle, Munindar P. Singh
{"title":"在一个安全、协作的环境中,理解在可变可观察性下的制裁","authors":"Hongying Du, Bennett Narron, Nirav Ajmeri, E. Berglund, J. Doyle, Munindar P. Singh","doi":"10.1145/2746194.2746206","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Norms are a promising basis for governance in secure, collaborative environments---systems in which multiple principals interact. Yet, many aspects of norm-governance remain poorly understood, inhibiting adoption in real-life collaborative systems. This work focuses on the combined effects of sanction and the observability of the sanctioner in a secure, collaborative environment. We present CARLOS, a multiagent simulation of graduate students performing research within a university lab setting, to explore these phenomena. The simulation consists of agents maintaining \"compliance\" to enforced security norms while remaining \"motivated\" as researchers. We hypothesize that (1) delayed observability of the environment would lead to greater motivation of agents to complete research tasks than immediate observability and (2) sanctioning a group for a violation would lead to greater compliance to security norms than sanctioning an individual. We find that only the latter hypothesis is supported. Group sanction is an interesting topic for future research regarding a means for norm-governance which yields significant compliance with enforced security policy at a lower cost. Our ultimate contribution is to apply social simulation as a way to explore environmental properties and policies to evaluate key transitions in outcome, as a basis for guiding further and more demanding empirical research.","PeriodicalId":134331,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Understanding sanction under variable observability in a secure, collaborative environment\",\"authors\":\"Hongying Du, Bennett Narron, Nirav Ajmeri, E. Berglund, J. Doyle, Munindar P. Singh\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2746194.2746206\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Norms are a promising basis for governance in secure, collaborative environments---systems in which multiple principals interact. Yet, many aspects of norm-governance remain poorly understood, inhibiting adoption in real-life collaborative systems. This work focuses on the combined effects of sanction and the observability of the sanctioner in a secure, collaborative environment. We present CARLOS, a multiagent simulation of graduate students performing research within a university lab setting, to explore these phenomena. The simulation consists of agents maintaining \\\"compliance\\\" to enforced security norms while remaining \\\"motivated\\\" as researchers. We hypothesize that (1) delayed observability of the environment would lead to greater motivation of agents to complete research tasks than immediate observability and (2) sanctioning a group for a violation would lead to greater compliance to security norms than sanctioning an individual. We find that only the latter hypothesis is supported. Group sanction is an interesting topic for future research regarding a means for norm-governance which yields significant compliance with enforced security policy at a lower cost. Our ultimate contribution is to apply social simulation as a way to explore environmental properties and policies to evaluate key transitions in outcome, as a basis for guiding further and more demanding empirical research.\",\"PeriodicalId\":134331,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-04-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746206\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746194.2746206","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5

摘要

规范是在安全的、协作的环境——多个主体在其中交互的系统——中进行治理的有希望的基础。然而,规范治理的许多方面仍然缺乏理解,阻碍了现实协作系统的采用。这项工作的重点是制裁的综合影响和制裁者在一个安全、协作的环境中的可观察性。我们提出了CARLOS,一个在大学实验室环境中进行研究的研究生的多智能体模拟,以探索这些现象。该模拟包括代理保持“遵守”强制安全规范,同时保持作为研究人员的“积极性”。我们假设:(1)环境的延迟可观察性比即时可观察性会导致代理人更大的动机来完成研究任务;(2)惩罚一个违反安全规范的群体比制裁一个个人会导致更大的遵守安全规范。我们发现只有后一种假设得到支持。群体制裁是未来研究的一个有趣的主题,它涉及规范治理的一种手段,它以较低的成本产生对强制安全策略的重大遵从。我们的最终贡献是将社会模拟作为一种探索环境属性和政策的方式,以评估结果的关键转变,作为指导进一步和更严格的实证研究的基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Understanding sanction under variable observability in a secure, collaborative environment
Norms are a promising basis for governance in secure, collaborative environments---systems in which multiple principals interact. Yet, many aspects of norm-governance remain poorly understood, inhibiting adoption in real-life collaborative systems. This work focuses on the combined effects of sanction and the observability of the sanctioner in a secure, collaborative environment. We present CARLOS, a multiagent simulation of graduate students performing research within a university lab setting, to explore these phenomena. The simulation consists of agents maintaining "compliance" to enforced security norms while remaining "motivated" as researchers. We hypothesize that (1) delayed observability of the environment would lead to greater motivation of agents to complete research tasks than immediate observability and (2) sanctioning a group for a violation would lead to greater compliance to security norms than sanctioning an individual. We find that only the latter hypothesis is supported. Group sanction is an interesting topic for future research regarding a means for norm-governance which yields significant compliance with enforced security policy at a lower cost. Our ultimate contribution is to apply social simulation as a way to explore environmental properties and policies to evaluate key transitions in outcome, as a basis for guiding further and more demanding empirical research.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信