网络优势、议价能力与联盟合同中价值获取权的分配

Umit Ozmel, M. Yavuz, J. Reuer, Todd R. Zenger
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们提出并提供了经验证据,表明联盟伙伴在联盟网络中的突出地位所产生的议价能力会影响高技术联盟合同中价值获取权的事前分配。网络突出可以提高企业可选择合作伙伴的可用性,从而提高企业的议价能力,使企业能够获得i)相对于其合作伙伴更多的价值获取权(即更多的净值获取权)和ii)相对于其合作伙伴更多的意外结果权利。我们对生物技术企业和制药企业之间的研发合作合同的内容进行了实证研究,结果表明,随着客户(即制药企业)的重要性增加,它能够获得i)更多的合作领域内成果的净价值获取权和ii)更多的意外成果权利。相比之下,研发公司(即生物技术公司)的重要性增加,既减少了客户获得的净值获取权的数量,也减少了客户在联盟合同中获得的意外结果的权利。在火热的IPO市场中,研发企业从联盟网络中获得的议价能力变得不那么重要,这为研发企业获得财务资源提供了更多的外部选择。因此,我们的论文证明,企业的网络位置可能是议价能力的重要来源,有助于研究战略联盟、议价和合同设计。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Network Prominence, Bargaining Power, and the Allocation of Value Capture Rights in Alliance Contracts
We suggest and provide empirical evidence that the bargaining power of alliance partners stemming from their prominence in alliance networks influences the ex-ante allocation of value capturing rights in high-tech alliance contracts. Network prominence can enhance the availability of alternative partners for a firm, and thereby elevates the firm’s bargaining power and enables the firm to receive i) more value capturing rights vis-a-vis its partner (i.e., more net value capturing rights) and ii) more rights to the unexpected outcomes vis-a-vis its partner. We empirically investigate the content of R&D collaboration contracts between biotech and pharmaceutical firms and show that as the prominence of the client (i.e., pharmaceutical firm) increases, it is able to attain i) more net value capturing rights to outcomes within the area of collaboration and ii) more rights to unexpected outcomes. By contrast, increased prominence of the R&D firm (i.e., biotech firm) decreases both the number of net value capturing rights the client receives as well as the rights to unexpected outcomes that the client captures in an alliance contract. The bargaining power that the R&D firm attains from its prominent position in alliance networks becomes less important during hot IPO markets, which provide the R&D firm more outside options to obtain financial resources. Hence, our paper documents that firms’ network positions can be an important source of bargaining power, contributing to the literature on strategic alliances, bargaining, and contract design.
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