{"title":"门德尔松、康德和启蒙运动","authors":"P. Guyer","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter contrasts the two philosophers’ 1784 essays on the question “What is Enlightenment?” True to his faith in theoretical reason, Mendelssohn interprets enlightenment as growth in knowledge, while true to his own faith in practical reason Kant interprets it more as moral maturity, willingness to take responsibility, especially in politics, rather than being passively led by external authority. Next the dispute between Mendelssohn and F.H. Jacobi over whether reason can prove the existence of God or it can be believed only by a leap of faith is examined, and Kant’s intervention in his essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?,” published in 1786 after the death of Mendelssohn, is then considered: Kant takes the side of reason in this dispute, but only of practical reason.","PeriodicalId":320962,"journal":{"name":"Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mendelssohn, Kant, and Enlightenment\",\"authors\":\"P. Guyer\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter contrasts the two philosophers’ 1784 essays on the question “What is Enlightenment?” True to his faith in theoretical reason, Mendelssohn interprets enlightenment as growth in knowledge, while true to his own faith in practical reason Kant interprets it more as moral maturity, willingness to take responsibility, especially in politics, rather than being passively led by external authority. Next the dispute between Mendelssohn and F.H. Jacobi over whether reason can prove the existence of God or it can be believed only by a leap of faith is examined, and Kant’s intervention in his essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?,” published in 1786 after the death of Mendelssohn, is then considered: Kant takes the side of reason in this dispute, but only of practical reason.\",\"PeriodicalId\":320962,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0010\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter contrasts the two philosophers’ 1784 essays on the question “What is Enlightenment?” True to his faith in theoretical reason, Mendelssohn interprets enlightenment as growth in knowledge, while true to his own faith in practical reason Kant interprets it more as moral maturity, willingness to take responsibility, especially in politics, rather than being passively led by external authority. Next the dispute between Mendelssohn and F.H. Jacobi over whether reason can prove the existence of God or it can be believed only by a leap of faith is examined, and Kant’s intervention in his essay “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?,” published in 1786 after the death of Mendelssohn, is then considered: Kant takes the side of reason in this dispute, but only of practical reason.