细节决定成败:破解Android上的加密劫持恶意软件生态系统

Boladji Vinny Adjibi, F. Mbodji, Tegawendé F. Bissyandé, Kevin Allix, Jacques Klein
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摘要

本文研究了软件开发人员用于在Android设备上构建和传播加密挖掘应用程序的各种技术和非技术工具和技术。我们对2019年4月至2022年5月期间收集的346个潜在的安卓挖矿应用程序进行了研究,发现谷歌Play商店中存在十多个挖矿应用程序,其中至少有一半在撰写本文(2022年6月)时仍然可用。我们观察到,许多挖矿应用并没有隐藏它们使用设备资源进行挖矿的情况,这被认为违反了商店对开发者的政策。我们估计,有超过1万名用户运行了直接从Google Play Store下载的挖矿应用程序,这让所谓的“严格”审查过程受到了质疑。此外,我们还证明,隐蔽的挖掘应用往往会嵌入到付费应用的免费版本中,或者冒充实用应用,为用户提供有价值的功能。最后,我们通过实证证明了加密劫持应用程序的资源消耗和恶意行为可能是微不足道的。我们假设典型用户,即使他们可能正在运行移动防病毒解决方案,也可以在没有警报的情况下长时间执行挖掘应用程序。我们希望我们的研究结果能够告知涉及Android设备安全的各个参与者,以对抗挥之不去的加密劫持威胁,并帮助他们更好地评估问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Devil is in the Details: Unwrapping the Cryptojacking Malware Ecosystem on Android
This paper investigates the various technical and non-technical tools and techniques that software developers use to build and disseminate crypto mining apps on Android devices. Our study of 346 potential Android mining apps, collected between April 2019 and May 2022, has revealed the presence of more than ten mining apps on the Google Play Store, with at least half of those still available at the time of writing this (June 2022). We observed that many of those mining apps do not conceal their usage of the device's resource for mining which is considered a violation of the store's policies for developers. We estimate that more than ten thousand users have run mining apps downloaded directly from the Google Play Store, which puts the supposedly “stringent” vetting process into question. Furthermore, we prove that covert mining apps tend to be embedded into supposedly free versions of premium apps or pose as utility apps that provide valuable features to users. Finally, we empirically demonstrate that cryptojacking apps' resource consumption and malicious behavior could be insignificant. We presume that typical users, even though they might be running a mobile antivirus solution, could execute a mining app for an extended period without being alerted. We expect our results to inform the various actors involved in the security of Android devices against the lingering threat of cryptojacking and help them better assess the problem.
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