JBS S.A.的腐败丑闻和林德布洛姆的组织合法性策略

Pablinne De Paula Oliveira, Fernanda Fernandes Rodrigues, Mariana Guerra
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摘要

目的:评估巴西肉类加工商JBS SA发布的叙述性财务报告,并确定该公司在应对最近的腐败丑闻时如何试图影响其信息用户。方法:基于合法性理论(Lindblom, 1994),对2017年基准年的叙述性财务报告(市场公告、重大事实、管理报告和参考表格和展望)进行定性分析。原创性/相关性:显示了管理者可以单独或同时、有意或无意地使用的参数,以实现、保持或恢复公司的合法性。操纵机制也显示在公司报告中使用。结果:JBS在所有报告中都使用了Lindblom(1994)的第一合法性策略,但在材料事实中使用的频率更高。由于JBS承认负面事件(即媒体报道的腐败丑闻)的影响,并提供了与如何解决这一威胁合法性的问题有关的信息,因此采用了这种策略(即巴西证券交易委员会和联邦检察官办公室)。理论/方法贡献:Lindblom(1994)的第二和第三合法性策略并不像文献中报道的那样频繁(分别为9%和12.5%)。除了文献之外,本研究还提供了对财务报告作为政治和经济环境中合法性和操纵的工具的更好理解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Os Escândalos De Corrupção Na JBS S.A. E As Estratégias De Legitimidade Organizacional De Lindblom
Objective: Evaluate the narrative financial reports released by the Brazilian meatpacker JBS SA and identify how the company has sought to influence its information user while coping with its recent corruption scandals.  Method: A qualitative analysis of narrative financial reports – Market Notices, Material Facts, Management Report, and Reference Form and Prospects – was carried out for the base year 2017 based on the Legitimacy Theory (Lindblom, 1994).Originality/Relevance: Parameters are shown that could be used by managers, separately or concurrently, intentionally or unintentionally, to achieve, preserve or recover the company’s legitimacy. Mechanisms of manipulation are also shown as used in corporate reports.Results: JBS used Lindblom’s (1994) first legitimacy strategy in all reports, but more frequently in the Material Facts. Such a strategy was used for regulatory and penal reasons (i.e., the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil, and the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office) as JBS acknowledged the impact of the negative event (i.e., the corruption scandals covered by the media) and provided information related to how it has addressed such a legitimacy-threatening problem.Theoretical/Methodological contributions: Lindblom’s (1994) 2nd and 3rd legitimacy strategies were not as frequent (9% and 12,5% respectively) as reported in the literature. Adding to the literature, this study provides a better understanding of financial reporting as an instrument of legitimacy and manipulation within the political and economic environment.
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