上市国有企业与中小股东待遇——来自印度的案例研究。

S. Pande
{"title":"上市国有企业与中小股东待遇——来自印度的案例研究。","authors":"S. Pande","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2570888","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The presence of the State as a dominant shareholder adds an additional complexity to the corporate governance challenges in organizations as often the State has goals that are different from the goals of the classic private shareholder who only seeks private gain.While corporate governance issues, arising from the role of the State as a dominant shareholder, are a sub set of the broader issues that arises from the role of a dominant shareholder, in expropriating minority shareholder rights in an organization, there is a fundamental difference between the position of minority shareholders in a State owned Enterprise (SoE) as compared to the position of minority shareholders in a normal business enterprise. The mere act of publicly listing SoEs does not turn them into capitalist entities whose principal aim changes to maximizing the value of the enterprise; post listing the inherent conflict between broader \"national interest\" (pursued by the State) and the \"minority interest\" (pursued by the minority shareholders) often continues in SoEs leading to a principal-principal problem between two sets of shareholders who may have different objectives. Privatization of SoEs inherently sets new terms for the relationship between the state and private capital which could give the latter an edge particularly in the transition period when SoEs are privatized. Investors, often minority shareholders, who have bought into such enterprises on listing, may declare any policy that restrict profiteering, in the guise of development, as amounting to oppression of the minority shareholders and may attempt to cow the State down. However, given that the value of the listed state entity arises, in most of the cases, from its monopoly position or from assets created earlier with public money or from assets/rights granted to the entity by the State, an obvious question that arises is to what extent are the new minority shareholders (after listing) entitled to claim exclusive rights on the value unlocked (post listing) and whether the State, as the majority shareholder, is justified in protecting its own interests (which would include broader social interests), however wrong they may be in the eyes of the new minority shareholders.The disinvestment program in India has been going through the throes of the minority versus majority debate and the challenge is to find an equitable position between the two extreme positions – one where the majority owners view the company’s objective as being run to serve the public interest and not necessarily to maximize its profits and the other where the minority owners go to the extent of holding the board members to be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility when they meekly toe the line in respect of the decision taken by the State, as the majority owner of the enterprise.This paper provides a snap shot of the disinvestment program in India and, in the backdrop of international best practices, draws some useful lessons through an analysis of some key instances of the treatment of minority shareholders in leading Indian SoEs and develops some useful pointers for good governance of SoEs in India.","PeriodicalId":343804,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","volume":"95 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Listed State Owned Enterprises (SoEs) and the Treatment of Minority Shareholders – Case Studies from India.\",\"authors\":\"S. Pande\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2570888\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The presence of the State as a dominant shareholder adds an additional complexity to the corporate governance challenges in organizations as often the State has goals that are different from the goals of the classic private shareholder who only seeks private gain.While corporate governance issues, arising from the role of the State as a dominant shareholder, are a sub set of the broader issues that arises from the role of a dominant shareholder, in expropriating minority shareholder rights in an organization, there is a fundamental difference between the position of minority shareholders in a State owned Enterprise (SoE) as compared to the position of minority shareholders in a normal business enterprise. The mere act of publicly listing SoEs does not turn them into capitalist entities whose principal aim changes to maximizing the value of the enterprise; post listing the inherent conflict between broader \\\"national interest\\\" (pursued by the State) and the \\\"minority interest\\\" (pursued by the minority shareholders) often continues in SoEs leading to a principal-principal problem between two sets of shareholders who may have different objectives. Privatization of SoEs inherently sets new terms for the relationship between the state and private capital which could give the latter an edge particularly in the transition period when SoEs are privatized. Investors, often minority shareholders, who have bought into such enterprises on listing, may declare any policy that restrict profiteering, in the guise of development, as amounting to oppression of the minority shareholders and may attempt to cow the State down. However, given that the value of the listed state entity arises, in most of the cases, from its monopoly position or from assets created earlier with public money or from assets/rights granted to the entity by the State, an obvious question that arises is to what extent are the new minority shareholders (after listing) entitled to claim exclusive rights on the value unlocked (post listing) and whether the State, as the majority shareholder, is justified in protecting its own interests (which would include broader social interests), however wrong they may be in the eyes of the new minority shareholders.The disinvestment program in India has been going through the throes of the minority versus majority debate and the challenge is to find an equitable position between the two extreme positions – one where the majority owners view the company’s objective as being run to serve the public interest and not necessarily to maximize its profits and the other where the minority owners go to the extent of holding the board members to be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility when they meekly toe the line in respect of the decision taken by the State, as the majority owner of the enterprise.This paper provides a snap shot of the disinvestment program in India and, in the backdrop of international best practices, draws some useful lessons through an analysis of some key instances of the treatment of minority shareholders in leading Indian SoEs and develops some useful pointers for good governance of SoEs in India.\",\"PeriodicalId\":343804,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"95 1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-02-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2570888\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Government Owned Firms (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2570888","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

国家作为主要股东的存在给组织中的公司治理挑战增加了额外的复杂性,因为国家的目标往往与只寻求私人利益的典型私人股东的目标不同。虽然由于国家作为主要股东的作用而产生的公司治理问题是主要股东作用所产生的更广泛问题的一个子集,但在征用组织中的少数股东权利方面,国有企业(SoE)的少数股东的地位与正常商业企业的少数股东的地位之间存在根本差异。单纯的国有企业上市行为并没有使其成为资本主义实体,其主要目标不再是企业价值最大化;在国有企业中,更广泛的“国家利益”(由国家追求)与“少数股东利益”(由少数股东追求)之间的内在冲突往往持续存在,导致两组股东之间的主要问题,这些股东可能有不同的目标。国有企业私有化本质上为国有资本和私人资本之间的关系设定了新的条件,这可能使后者在国有企业私有化的过渡时期具有优势。在上市时买进这些企业股份的投资者,通常是少数股东,可能会宣布任何以发展为幌子限制牟取暴利的政策都是对少数股东的压迫,并可能企图使国家屈服。然而,考虑到在大多数情况下,上市国家实体的价值来自其垄断地位,或来自早期用公共资金创造的资产,或来自国家授予实体的资产/权利,一个显而易见的问题是,新的少数股东(上市后)在多大程度上有权要求对解锁的价值(上市后)拥有专有权,以及作为大股东的国家是否在保护自身利益(包括更广泛的社会利益)方面是合理的,无论这些利益在新的少数股东眼中是多么的错误。减持计划在印度已经经历的阵痛少数与多数辩论和所面临的挑战是找到一个公平的位置之间的两个极端的位置——一个多数业主查看公司的目标是为公众利益服务运行,不一定要最大化其利润和其他少数业主去持有董事会成员的程度上违反受托责任当他们温顺地脚趾国家作为企业的多数股东所作的决定。本文简要介绍了印度的撤资计划,并在国际最佳实践的背景下,通过对印度主要国有企业少数股东待遇的一些关键案例的分析,得出了一些有益的经验教训,并为印度国有企业的良好治理提出了一些有用的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Listed State Owned Enterprises (SoEs) and the Treatment of Minority Shareholders – Case Studies from India.
The presence of the State as a dominant shareholder adds an additional complexity to the corporate governance challenges in organizations as often the State has goals that are different from the goals of the classic private shareholder who only seeks private gain.While corporate governance issues, arising from the role of the State as a dominant shareholder, are a sub set of the broader issues that arises from the role of a dominant shareholder, in expropriating minority shareholder rights in an organization, there is a fundamental difference between the position of minority shareholders in a State owned Enterprise (SoE) as compared to the position of minority shareholders in a normal business enterprise. The mere act of publicly listing SoEs does not turn them into capitalist entities whose principal aim changes to maximizing the value of the enterprise; post listing the inherent conflict between broader "national interest" (pursued by the State) and the "minority interest" (pursued by the minority shareholders) often continues in SoEs leading to a principal-principal problem between two sets of shareholders who may have different objectives. Privatization of SoEs inherently sets new terms for the relationship between the state and private capital which could give the latter an edge particularly in the transition period when SoEs are privatized. Investors, often minority shareholders, who have bought into such enterprises on listing, may declare any policy that restrict profiteering, in the guise of development, as amounting to oppression of the minority shareholders and may attempt to cow the State down. However, given that the value of the listed state entity arises, in most of the cases, from its monopoly position or from assets created earlier with public money or from assets/rights granted to the entity by the State, an obvious question that arises is to what extent are the new minority shareholders (after listing) entitled to claim exclusive rights on the value unlocked (post listing) and whether the State, as the majority shareholder, is justified in protecting its own interests (which would include broader social interests), however wrong they may be in the eyes of the new minority shareholders.The disinvestment program in India has been going through the throes of the minority versus majority debate and the challenge is to find an equitable position between the two extreme positions – one where the majority owners view the company’s objective as being run to serve the public interest and not necessarily to maximize its profits and the other where the minority owners go to the extent of holding the board members to be in breach of their fiduciary responsibility when they meekly toe the line in respect of the decision taken by the State, as the majority owner of the enterprise.This paper provides a snap shot of the disinvestment program in India and, in the backdrop of international best practices, draws some useful lessons through an analysis of some key instances of the treatment of minority shareholders in leading Indian SoEs and develops some useful pointers for good governance of SoEs in India.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信