使用aslan++验证OAuth

Haixing Yan, Huixing Fang, Christian Kuka, Huibiao Zhu
{"title":"使用aslan++验证OAuth","authors":"Haixing Yan, Huixing Fang, Christian Kuka, Huibiao Zhu","doi":"10.1109/HASE.2015.20","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few years, OAuth has become an open authorization standard that is being adopted by a growing number of sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Google. It allows users to grant a third-party application access to restricted resources without providing their credentials. However, ensuring the correctness of implementations of OAuth in applications brings multiple concerns. Therefore, it is crucial to verify OAuth with an exhaustive examination by utilizing formal methods. In this paper, we first formalize OAuth with ASLan++ on the AVANTSSAR platform and propose several fundamental security properties on it which are specified using extended Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. In a second step, we use a SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) to verify whether OAuth violates these properties. As a result, we reveal three attacks which steal and falsify users' critical information.","PeriodicalId":248645,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Verification for OAuth Using ASLan++\",\"authors\":\"Haixing Yan, Huixing Fang, Christian Kuka, Huibiao Zhu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/HASE.2015.20\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Over the past few years, OAuth has become an open authorization standard that is being adopted by a growing number of sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Google. It allows users to grant a third-party application access to restricted resources without providing their credentials. However, ensuring the correctness of implementations of OAuth in applications brings multiple concerns. Therefore, it is crucial to verify OAuth with an exhaustive examination by utilizing formal methods. In this paper, we first formalize OAuth with ASLan++ on the AVANTSSAR platform and propose several fundamental security properties on it which are specified using extended Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. In a second step, we use a SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) to verify whether OAuth violates these properties. As a result, we reveal three attacks which steal and falsify users' critical information.\",\"PeriodicalId\":248645,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-01-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/HASE.2015.20\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HASE.2015.20","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

摘要

在过去的几年里,OAuth已经成为一个开放的授权标准,被越来越多的网站(如Twitter、Facebook和Google)采用。它允许用户在不提供凭据的情况下授予第三方应用程序对受限资源的访问权。然而,确保应用程序中OAuth实现的正确性会带来多个问题。因此,通过使用形式化方法进行详尽的检查来验证OAuth至关重要。本文首先在AVANTSSAR平台上使用aslan++形式化OAuth,并提出了几个基本的安全属性,这些属性使用扩展线性时间逻辑(LTL)公式来指定。在第二步中,我们使用基于sat的模型检查器(SATMC)来验证OAuth是否违反了这些属性。因此,我们揭示了三种窃取和伪造用户关键信息的攻击。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Verification for OAuth Using ASLan++
Over the past few years, OAuth has become an open authorization standard that is being adopted by a growing number of sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Google. It allows users to grant a third-party application access to restricted resources without providing their credentials. However, ensuring the correctness of implementations of OAuth in applications brings multiple concerns. Therefore, it is crucial to verify OAuth with an exhaustive examination by utilizing formal methods. In this paper, we first formalize OAuth with ASLan++ on the AVANTSSAR platform and propose several fundamental security properties on it which are specified using extended Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. In a second step, we use a SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) to verify whether OAuth violates these properties. As a result, we reveal three attacks which steal and falsify users' critical information.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信