有备无患银行公司治理新规能否防止过度冒险?

M. Brogi, Valentina Lagasio
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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统观点认为,良好的治理可以支撑银行的业绩,而糟糕的治理则会破坏银行的稳定和稳健。利用欧洲斯托克指数中的银行,我们进行了一个因子分析,使我们能够将23个银行董事会特征综合为七个关键特征:独立性、规模、奉献精神、任期、公司治理质量、外部视角、能力和多样性。然后,我们使用多元回归发现,公司治理确实抑制了我们样本中银行的风险承担(用Z-Score衡量)。我们的研究结果试图评估哪些治理变量与监管机构在控制银行风险承担方面最相关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Better Safe than Sorry. Will New Rules on Bank Corporate Governance Prevent Excessive Risk Taking?
Conventional wisdom leads to assert that good governance may underpin bank performance while bad governance destroys stability and soundness. Using the banks in the Eurostoxx index, we run a factor analysis that enables us to synthesize 23 bank board characteristics into seven key features: independence, size, dedication, tenure, corporate governance quality, external perspective, competence and diversity. We then use a multiple regression and find that indeed Corporate Governance curbs risk taking - measured by Z-Score - by banks in our sample. Our findings try to assess which governance variables are most relevant for regulators in containing bank risk taking.
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