Seth Lyles, Mark Desantis, John Donaldson, Micaela Gallegos, Hannah Nyholm, C. Taylor, Kristine Monteith
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Machine Learning Analysis of Memory Images for Process Characterization and Malware Detection
As signature-based malware detection techniques mature, malware authors have been forced to leave fewer footprints on target machines. Malicious activity can be conducted by chaining together benign, built-in functions in subversive ways. Because the functions are native to the host system, attackers can slip under the radar of signature filtering tools such as YARA. To address this challenge, we utilize the Volatility memory forensics framework to measure and characterize typical in-memory behavior, then observe the deviations from normal use that may indicate a compromise. We demonstrate that processes have characteristic memory footprints, and that machine learning models can flag malicious behavior as anomalous.