工会和企业养老金政策

Kyongsun Heo, Jinhan Pae
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究的目的是探讨工会对企业年金政策的影响。利用企业层面的工会数据,它检验了有组织的劳工是否减轻了财务状况表中养老金负债的低估。接下来,我们考察工会的存在是否会影响外部企业养老基金。我们发现,有工会的企业在重新计量养老金负债时往往报告较小的精算收益(或较大的精算损失),这表明工会在报告企业养老金负债方面发挥了监督作用,或者企业试图通过夸大企业养老金负债的财务负担来提高与工会的议价能力。我们没有发现拥有工会的公司的养老金资金水平(计划资产的公允价值与养老金负债的比率)更高。总体而言,我们的研究结果表明,工会限制了管理层低估养老金负债的激励,但工会对企业养老金融资决策的影响有限。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Labour unions and corporate pension policy
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of labour unions on corporate pension policies. Using firm-level labour union data, it examines whether organized labour mitigates the understatement of pension liabilities on the statement of financial position. Next, we examine whether union presence affects external corporate pension funding. We find that firms with labour unions tend to report smaller actuarial gains (or larger actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities, suggesting that labour unions play a monitoring role in the reporting of corporate pension liabilities and/or that firms try to enhance their bargaining power with the labour union by exaggerating their financial burden of corporate pension liabilities. We do not find that the pension funding level (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to pension liabilities) is higher for firms with labour unions. Overall, our results indicate that labour unions constrain management incentives to understate pension liabilities, but they have limited influence on corporate pension funding decisions.
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