{"title":"通过安保实现安全","authors":"A. Simpson","doi":"10.1109/IWSSD.1998.667915","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper illustrates that the concept of noninterference, used in theories of security, may also be used to reason about safety. It presents a technique for modelling safety properties in terms of communicating processes, and develops a practical theory of system protection from failures. A simple example is presented to illustrate the application of this technique to different classes of safety property.","PeriodicalId":431074,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings Ninth International Workshop on Software Specification and Design","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1998-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"45","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Safety through security\",\"authors\":\"A. Simpson\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/IWSSD.1998.667915\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper illustrates that the concept of noninterference, used in theories of security, may also be used to reason about safety. It presents a technique for modelling safety properties in terms of communicating processes, and develops a practical theory of system protection from failures. A simple example is presented to illustrate the application of this technique to different classes of safety property.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431074,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings Ninth International Workshop on Software Specification and Design\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1998-04-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"45\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings Ninth International Workshop on Software Specification and Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/IWSSD.1998.667915\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings Ninth International Workshop on Software Specification and Design","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IWSSD.1998.667915","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper illustrates that the concept of noninterference, used in theories of security, may also be used to reason about safety. It presents a technique for modelling safety properties in terms of communicating processes, and develops a practical theory of system protection from failures. A simple example is presented to illustrate the application of this technique to different classes of safety property.
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