PLC访问控制:安全性分析

Haroon Wardak, Sami Zhioua, Ahmad Almulhem
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引用次数: 36

摘要

可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)是一种非常常见的工业控制系统设备,用于根据从输入设备接收(和处理)的数据来控制输出设备。鉴于plc在部署的工业控制系统中发挥的核心作用,它一直是ICS攻击者的首选目标。在ICS-CERT存储库中快速搜索发现,在总共589个建议中,超过80个针对plc。Stuxnet攻击被认为是ICS中最著名的事件,主要针对plc。大多数PLC报告的事件都源于PLC以未经授权的方式被访问。本文主要研究PLC的访问控制问题。我们讨论了几种访问控制模型,但我们主要关注的是常用的基于密码的访问控制。我们展示了这种基于密码的机制在现实场景中是如何被破坏的,并列出了由此可能引发的攻击。本文详细介绍了一组针对最近版本的plc(2016)的漏洞,这些漏洞在文献中尚未报道。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
PLC access control: a security analysis
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a very common industrial control system device used to control output devices based on data received (and processed) from input devices. Given the central role that PLCs play in deployed industrial control systems, it has been a preferred target of ICS attackers. A quick search in the ICS-CERT repository reveals that out of a total of 589 advisories, more than 80 target PLCs. Stuxnet attack, considered the most famous reported incident on ICS, targeted mainly PLCs. Most of the PLC reported incidents are rooted in the fact that the PLC being accessed in an unauthorized way. In this paper, we investigate the PLC access control problem. We discuss several access control models but we focus mainly on the commonly adopted password-based access control. We show how such passwordbased mechanism can be compromised in a realistic scenario as well as the list the attacks that can be derived as a consequence. This paper details a set of vulnerabilities targeting recent versions of PLCs (2016) which have not been reported in the literature.
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