{"title":"宪法是否处于危险之中?实体正当程序与刑法","authors":"E. Tennen","doi":"10.15779/Z38JK7W","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"¶1. For quite some time, scholars have debated whether or not there are any constitutional limits to substantive criminal law.[1] Although the Court has cautiously resisted the chance to constitutionalize criminal law overtly, it has been delving into substantive criminal law since the turn of the twentieth century.[2] To be sure, the Court often disguises these forays as cases about substantive due process generally, and privacy, specifically.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Is the Constitution in Harm's Way?Substantive Due Process and Criminal Law\",\"authors\":\"E. Tennen\",\"doi\":\"10.15779/Z38JK7W\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"¶1. For quite some time, scholars have debated whether or not there are any constitutional limits to substantive criminal law.[1] Although the Court has cautiously resisted the chance to constitutionalize criminal law overtly, it has been delving into substantive criminal law since the turn of the twentieth century.[2] To be sure, the Court often disguises these forays as cases about substantive due process generally, and privacy, specifically.\",\"PeriodicalId\":386851,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38JK7W\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38JK7W","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Is the Constitution in Harm's Way?Substantive Due Process and Criminal Law
¶1. For quite some time, scholars have debated whether or not there are any constitutional limits to substantive criminal law.[1] Although the Court has cautiously resisted the chance to constitutionalize criminal law overtly, it has been delving into substantive criminal law since the turn of the twentieth century.[2] To be sure, the Court often disguises these forays as cases about substantive due process generally, and privacy, specifically.