首价拍卖的进场模式是什么?非参数方法

ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-06-21 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1628367

Vadim Marmer, Artyom Shneyerov, P. Xu

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引用次数: 105

摘要

我们开发了一种非参数方法，允许在首价拍卖的备选进入模型之间进行区分。本文考虑了三种进入模型:Levin和Smith(1994)的模型，Samuelson(1985)的模型，以及一个在进入阶段收到的信息与投标人估值不完全相关的新模型。基于支持竞争的选择效应如何随着潜在投标人数量的增加而改变投标人估值分位数，我们得出了这些模型的可测试限制。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach

We develop a nonparametric approach that allows for discrimination among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions. Three models of entry are considered: those of Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), and a new model in which the information received at the entry stage is imperfectly correlated with bidder valuations. We derive testable restrictions of these models based on how the pro-competitive selection effect shifts bidder valuation quantiles in response to an increase in the number of potential bidders.

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ERN: Entry & Exit (Topic)

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