网络安全:毁损网站游戏中防御者和攻击者策略的博弈论分析

Palvi Aggarwal, Antra Grover, Saumya Singh, Zahid Maqbool, V. Pammi, Varun Dutt
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引用次数: 7

摘要

全球范围内网络攻击的增长速度预先描绘了一幅可怕的画面。这种攻击的主要动力可以根据网络安全游戏中攻击者和防御者的行动来研究。然而,目前很少有研究对这种相互作用进行研究。在本文中,我们使用行为博弈论,并试图调查攻击者和防御者在破坏网站的模拟网络攻击场景中所采取的某些行动的作用。我们选择强化学习(RL)模型来代表2×4网络安全游戏中的模拟攻击者和防御者,其中两个玩家中的每个人最多可以采取4个行动。在1000次模拟中,对一对模型参与者进行了计算模拟,每对参与者最多玩了30轮游戏。攻击者的目标是破坏网站,防御者的目标是阻止攻击者这样做。我们的研究结果表明,攻击者和防御者所采取的行动是这些角色对他们最近获得的结果的关注的函数。据观察,如果攻击者更关注最近的结果,那么他更有可能执行攻击行动。我们讨论了我们的结果对网络安全博弈中攻击者和防御者之间动态演变的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cyber security: A game-theoretic analysis of defender and attacker strategies in defacing-website games
The rate at which cyber-attacks are increasing globally portrays a terrifying picture upfront. The main dynamics of such attacks could be studied in terms of the actions of attackers and defenders in a cyber-security game. However currently little research has taken place to study such interactions. In this paper we use behavioral game theory and try to investigate the role of certain actions taken by attackers and defenders in a simulated cyber-attack scenario of defacing a website. We choose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) model to represent a simulated attacker and a defender in a 2×4 cyber-security game where each of the 2 players could take up to 4 actions. A pair of model participants were computationally simulated across 1000 simulations where each pair played at most 30 rounds in the game. The goal of the attacker was to deface the website and the goal of the defender was to prevent the attacker from doing so. Our results show that the actions taken by both the attackers and defenders are a function of attention paid by these roles to their recently obtained outcomes. It was observed that if attacker pays more attention to recent outcomes then he is more likely to perform attack actions. We discuss the implication of our results on the evolution of dynamics between attackers and defenders in cyber-security games.
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