作为中间产品的农作物品种创新与知识产权

Derek J. F. Eaton
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摘要

知识产权保护赋予创新者的可占有性程度所涉及的权衡,仍然是一个有许多未解之谜的领域。本文考虑了产品创新的知识产权案例,其中产品是用于生产最终消费品的中间产品。最终产品的生产者从垄断者那里购买创新产品,这在垂直产品差异化框架中表现出来。创新受知识产权保护,其适用程度由政策制定者决定。分析揭示了传统创新与扩散权衡的一些新方面。最终产品的生产效率更高的生产者受益于更严格的适宜性和由此产生的更高水平的创新。生产效率较低的生产者和消费者在适当的可挪用性水平下会过得更好。这篇论文的动机来自农业部门,在农业部门中,创新者利用遗传资源生产新的作物品种,并将其销售给从创新中获利的能力表现出异质性的农业部门。在过去四十年中,授予植物品种专有权的范围在各国有所扩大,部分原因是《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》,并且在国际和国家层面上一直是许多政策辩论的主题,部分原因是对粮食安全的潜在影响。由于这些原因,该模型被扩展到由北方和南方组成的两个国家的情况,这既突出了南方对维持较低水平的适当性的兴趣,也突出了北方农民要求南方提高其标准的压力。这未必对全球消费者有利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Innovation and IPRs for Agricultural Crop Varieties as Intermediate Goods
The tradeoffs involved in the extent of appropriability conferred by intellectual property right (IPR) protection to innovators remains an area with many unanswered questions. This paper considers the case of IPRs for product innovations where the product is an intermediate good used to produce a final consumer good. Producers of the final good purchase an innovation from a monopolist, represented in a vertical product differentiation framework. The innovation is subject to an IPR for which the extent of appropriability is determined by a policy maker. The analysis reveals some novel aspects of the traditional innovation versus diffusion tradeoff. More productive producers of the final good benefit from stricter appropriability and the resulting higher level of innovation. Less productive producers, and also consumers, are better off with a moderate level of appropriability. The paper is motivated by the agricultural sector in which an innovator uses genetic resources to produce new crop varieties to be marketed to a farm sector that displays heterogeneity in its ability to profit from the innovation. The scope of the exclusive rights granted over plant varieties has increased in various countries over the past four decades, partly as a result of the TRIPS Agreement, and has been the subject of much policy debate at international, as well as national, levels, partly given potential implications for food security. For these reasons, the model is extended to a two country setting consisting of North and South, which highlights both the interest of the South in maintaining lower levels of appropriability, but also the pressure from farmers in the North for the South to raise its standards. This would not necessarily benefit global consumers.
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