从四骑士到六规则:司法服从的解构

Keith W. Rizzardi
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摘要

在其动荡的2022年任期内,最高法院再次重新平衡了三权分立。当司法部门审查政府其他部门的行为时,通过判例法和成文法形成了自我约束的传统。司法部门通常接受国会对法律是否必要和适当的判断,并遵从行政机构对这些国会法案的解释。然而,由于担心未经选举的行政机构官僚可能不受约束的决策权,司法服从的历史概念受到了批评。新兴的替代体系可能更糟。历史提供了类似的例子。在罗斯福新政期间,被称为“四骑士”(Four Horsemen)的最高法院核心法官小组经常否决政府机构的行动或立法行为,显然是基于他们对经济政策的看法。但在随后的“时间转换拯救了9人”(Switch in Time that save 9)期间,法院中不断变化的多数法官行使了司法克制,支持国会和行政机构的政策判断。时钟似乎在2022年倒回,新的保守派多数法官宣布法规不足,并推翻了机构的行动,采用了类似于他们的新政前任的逻辑。通过解构司法服从,这些法官现在可以实施“六原则”,并有选择地选择适用的解释原则,以实现他们个人喜欢的政策结果。美国治理的根本问题是“谁来决定?”2022年,未经选举产生的最高法院扩大了对未经选举产生的机构专家和民选官员的权力。不可避免地,历史将会重演,关于法院改革的争论将会重新出现。但就目前而言,在我们这个充满紧急情况、流行病和气候危机的非凡时代,马背上出现了六个身穿长袍的骑手。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
From Four Horsemen to the Rule of Six: The Deconstruction of Judicial Deference
In its tumultuous 2022 term, the Supreme Court rebalanced the separation of powers, again. A tradition of self-restraint has evolved through case law and statutes when the judiciary reviews the actions of the other branches of government. The judiciary often accepts congressional judgments as to whether laws are necessary and proper and defers to executive agency interpretations of those congressional acts. The historical notion of judicial deference, however, earned criticism due to concerns about the potential unchecked decision-making power of unelected executive agency bureaucrats. The emerging alternative system might be worse. History offers parallels. During the New Deal, a core group of Supreme Court justices known as the “Four Horsemen” often struck down agency actions or legislative acts, apparently based upon their views of economic policy. But during the “Switch in Time that Saved Nine” that followed, a changing majority of the Court exercised judicial restraint, upholding policy judgments by Congress and the executive agencies. The clock seemingly rewound in 2022, as a new conservative majority of justices declared statutes insufficient and struck down agency actions, embracing a logic akin to their New Deal predecessors. By deconstructing judicial deference, these justices can now impose the Rule of Six and selectively choose the applicable interpretive doctrine to achieve their personally preferred policy outcomes. The fundamental question of American governance is “Who decides?”. In 2022, the unelected Supreme Court expanded its power over both unelected agency experts and elected officials. Inevitably, history will echo, and debates over court reforms will remerge. But for now, in our extraordinary era of emergencies, epidemics, and a climate crisis, six robed riders on horseback have appeared.
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