“如果我们失去捷克斯洛伐克,我将辞去总书记的职务。”勃列日涅夫和1968年的捷克斯洛伐克危机

M. Polynov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

1968年,苏联与捷克斯洛伐克的关系出现危机,这是苏联及其华约盟国面临的最严峻的外交政策问题之一。这篇文章的作者基于包括苏共中央政治局在内的解密文件,文章表明,苏联当局及其东欧盟友非常担心,在捷克斯洛伐克开展的改革将开启脱离社会主义的前景,并随后退出华沙条约。在那里公开活动的反社会主义和反苏联势力尤其令人担忧。苏联领导人,特别是勃列日涅夫,试图通过与捷克斯洛伐克方面的政治妥协和履行在多边会议期间作出的承诺来解决这一尖锐局势。最初,他们避免了对捷克斯洛伐克的军事干预,这是由苏联的盟友坚持的,ATS的成员,即波兰,民主德国,保加利亚和匈牙利。然而,捷克斯洛伐克领导人,首先是A. dub ek,没有遵守达成的协议(特别是停止反苏媒体运动和人事变动),尽管这本来可以阻止部队进入。到1968年8月,通过政治手段摆脱这种局面的可能性已经用尽。不仅华约五国要为这次入侵负责,捷克斯洛伐克的领导人也要为此负责。苏联和其他ATS国家在做出出兵决定时,以拯救捷克斯洛伐克的社会主义和保留其作为华沙条约一部分的动机为指导。冷战期间北约的团结使其有可能确保与北约在欧洲大陆的力量平衡。对其他社会主义国家为拯救社会主义而干涉社会主义联合体一国或另一国事务的权利的理论论证,是在军队进入后提出的。在西方,这一政策被称为“勃列日涅夫主义”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
“IF WE LOSE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, I WILL STEP DOWN FROM THE POST OF GENERAL SECRETARY”. L.I. BREZHNEV AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS OF 1968
Th e crisis in relations with Czechoslovakia, arose in 1968, was one of the most acute foreign policy problems for the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Th e author of the article, which is based on declassifi ed documents, including the ones of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, showed that the USSR authorities and their East European allies were seriously afraid that the reforms launched in Czechoslovakia would open the prospect of the departure from socialism and the subsequent withdrawal of the country from the Warsaw Pact. Th e anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces that were openly op-erating there were of particular concern. Th e leaders of the USSR, especially L.I. Brezhnev, sought to resolve this acute situation through political compro-mises with Czechoslovak side and its fulfi llment of the commitments made during the multilateral meetings. Initially they avoided a military intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was insisted upon by the allies of the Soviet Union, the members of the ATS, i.e., Poland, GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary. However, the Czechoslovak leaders, A. Dubček in the fi rst place, did not comply with the reached agreements (in particular, stoppping the anti-Soviet media campaign and personnel changes), although this could have prevented the entry of troops. By August 1968, the possibilities of getting out of the situation by political means had been exhausted. Not only the fi ve Warsaw Pact countries were responsible for the invasion, but also the leaders of Czechoslovakia. Th e USSR and the other ATS countries were guided by the motive of saving socialism in Czechoslovakia and its preservation as part of the Warsaw Pact when making the decision to send in troops. Th e ATS unity during the Cold War made it possible to ensure the balance of power with the NATO on the European continent. Th e theoretical justifi cation of the right to interfere in the aff airs of one or another country of the socialist commonwealth by other socialist countries to save socialism was given aft er the entry of troops. In the West, this policy will become known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine”.
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