{"title":"易犯错误的直觉:数学中的先验","authors":"C. Kielkopf","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82464","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In his: The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge,! Philip Kitcher argues that we do not have apriori knowledge of mathematical truths. While arguing that nothing warrants holding a mathematical claim with the certainty required for knowledge of it to be apriori, he reminds so-called apriorists that some mathematical lrnowledge is based on long and complex proofs. Kitcher has his apriorists suggest that we need not be certain of all our apriori knowledge. At this suggestion Kitcher warns:","PeriodicalId":226742,"journal":{"name":"Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mathematics – I","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1988-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fallible Intuitions: The Apriori in Your Mathematics\",\"authors\":\"C. Kielkopf\",\"doi\":\"10.21825/philosophica.82464\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In his: The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge,! Philip Kitcher argues that we do not have apriori knowledge of mathematical truths. While arguing that nothing warrants holding a mathematical claim with the certainty required for knowledge of it to be apriori, he reminds so-called apriorists that some mathematical lrnowledge is based on long and complex proofs. Kitcher has his apriorists suggest that we need not be certain of all our apriori knowledge. At this suggestion Kitcher warns:\",\"PeriodicalId\":226742,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mathematics – I\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1988-01-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mathematics – I\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82464\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Recent Issues in the Philosophy of Mathematics – I","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82464","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Fallible Intuitions: The Apriori in Your Mathematics
In his: The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge,! Philip Kitcher argues that we do not have apriori knowledge of mathematical truths. While arguing that nothing warrants holding a mathematical claim with the certainty required for knowledge of it to be apriori, he reminds so-called apriorists that some mathematical lrnowledge is based on long and complex proofs. Kitcher has his apriorists suggest that we need not be certain of all our apriori knowledge. At this suggestion Kitcher warns:
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