研发投资与股利支付:关于中国半强制性股利政策的证据

Bao Yang, Hsin-I Chou, J. Zhao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自2001年以来,中国证监会实施了一系列政策,以确保股息支付成为股权融资的先决条件。这就是所谓的半强制性股息政策。以2007 - 2015年的中国上市公司为样本,我们发现研发投入越多的公司倾向于支付更多的股息。虽然这与经典的股利定理不一致,但可以用半强制性股利政策和研发投资的特殊性来解释。研发企业更有可能有股权融资需求,并且它们有支付股息以进入外部资本市场的战略激励。对于现金持有量较低、财务约束较少的公司来说,这种融资支付激励机制更强。通过研究未来的股权发行,我们进一步证明股权融资需求是研发投资积极影响股息支付的潜在机制。此外,我们发现这种半强制性股息支付对公司价值和可持续增长产生不利影响,并且在控制了内生性问题后,我们的发现仍然成立。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
R&D Investments and Dividend Payout: Evidence concerning the Semi-Mandatory Dividend Policy in China
Since 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has implemented a series of policies to ensure that dividend payments constitute a prerequisite of equity financing. This is known as the semi-mandatory dividend policy. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2015, we document that firms with more R&D investments tend to pay more dividends. While this is not consistent with the classical dividend theorem, it can be explained by the semi-mandatory dividend policy and the unique features of R&D investments. R&D firms are more likely to have equity financing needs and they have strategic incentives to pay dividends in order to access external capital markets. Such pay-for-financing incentives are stronger for firms with lower cash holdings and less financial constraints. By examining future seasoned equity offerings, we further demonstrate equity financing needs as the underlying mechanism for R&D investments to positively affect dividend payout. In addition, we show that such semi-mandatory dividend payments adversely affect firm value and sustainable growth and our findings hold after controlling for endogeneity issues.
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