传染下的道德风险

Boli Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了动态伙伴关系,其中每个参与者可以随时退出,并且退出的参与者继续享受伙伴关系的一些利益。我们分析了背叛的传染,并表明严重的传染通过阻止搭便车而促进了参与者之间的合作。这种独特的均衡具有生产率诅咒的特征,即伙伴关系的较大产出可能会加剧搭便车,从而损害所有参与者。另一个主要发现是,伙伴关系维持合作的能力在规模上是非单调的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Moral Hazard Under Contagion
We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to enjoy some benefits of the partnership. We analyze the contagion of defections and show that severe contagion facilitates cooperation among players by deterring free-riding. The unique equilibrium features a curse of productivity, namely, a larger output of the partnership may harm all players by exacerbating free-riding. Another main finding is that a partnership's ability to sustain cooperation is non-monotonic in its size.
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