{"title":"传染下的道德风险","authors":"Boli Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3847105","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to enjoy some benefits of the partnership. We analyze the contagion of defections and show that severe contagion facilitates cooperation among players by deterring free-riding. The unique equilibrium features a curse of productivity, namely, a larger output of the partnership may harm all players by exacerbating free-riding. Another main finding is that a partnership's ability to sustain cooperation is non-monotonic in its size.","PeriodicalId":319981,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Hazard Under Contagion\",\"authors\":\"Boli Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3847105\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to enjoy some benefits of the partnership. We analyze the contagion of defections and show that severe contagion facilitates cooperation among players by deterring free-riding. The unique equilibrium features a curse of productivity, namely, a larger output of the partnership may harm all players by exacerbating free-riding. Another main finding is that a partnership's ability to sustain cooperation is non-monotonic in its size.\",\"PeriodicalId\":319981,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-06-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3847105\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Stochastic & Dynamic Games (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3847105","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to enjoy some benefits of the partnership. We analyze the contagion of defections and show that severe contagion facilitates cooperation among players by deterring free-riding. The unique equilibrium features a curse of productivity, namely, a larger output of the partnership may harm all players by exacerbating free-riding. Another main finding is that a partnership's ability to sustain cooperation is non-monotonic in its size.