德比游戏:一个基于订单的上校Blotto游戏

Akash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Weinberg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

《Colonel Blotto》游戏及其变体是研究可互换资源(游戏邦注:如士兵、金钱或选票)竞争性分配的常用方法。我们引入了一种新的Blotto变体,我们称之为德比游戏,以研究不可互换资源的竞争性分配,例如政治中的竞选代理人或公司中的熟练工人,并分析其纳什均衡。虽然德比博弈不存在纯粹的纳什均衡,但我们的主要结果令人惊讶地表明,纳什均衡一般存在于一方采取纯粹策略的情况下,我们给出了这种均衡的充分必要条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game
The Colonel Blotto game and its variants are a common approach to study competitive allocation of interchangeable resources (e.g., soldiers, money, or votes). We introduce a new variant of Blotto, which we call the Derby game, to study competitive allocation of non-interchangeable resources, such as campaign surrogates in politics or skilled workers in companies, and analyze its Nash equilibria. While Derby games unsurprisingly admit no pure Nash equilibria, our main results surprisingly show that Nash equilibria generically exist where one player plays a pure strategy, and we give necessary and sufficient conditions for such equilibria.
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