Yu和Kong(2020)的《稳健合同设计:线性合同和道德风险》中指出的错误

ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-29 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3895883

Jingyuan Yang, Linwei Xin

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摘要

Yu和Kong(2020)的“稳健合同设计:线性合同和道德风险”的主要结果之一是命题4，该命题指出，具有分段线性凹型代理效用的最优稳健合同仅由渐进式固定支付和线性奖励组成。在本文中，我们构造了一个反例来证明这个结果是错误的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Error Noted in “Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard” by Yu and Kong (2020)

One of the main results of “Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard” by Yu and Kong (2020) is Proposition 4, which states that the optimal robust contract with a piecewise linear concave agent utility only consists of progressive fixed payments and linear rewards with progressive commission rates. In this note, we construct a counterexample showing that this result is wrong.

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ERN: Economics of Contract: Theory (Topic)

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