{"title":"分布式能源聚合对电力市场效率的影响","authors":"Khaled Alshehri, Mariola Ndrio, S. Bose, T. Başar","doi":"10.1109/CISS.2019.8692823","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Distributed energy resources (DERs) have too small supply capacities to directly participate in a wholesale electricity market. In this paper, we study the efficiency of the market, when a collection of DERs are represented by a profit-maximizing aggregator. We model the interaction between the aggregator and the DER owners as a Stackelberg game. Our analysis characterizes the price of aggregation—the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator in representing a collection of DERs as opposed to direct DER participation in the wholesale market.","PeriodicalId":123696,"journal":{"name":"2019 53rd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impact of Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources on Electricity Market Efficiency\",\"authors\":\"Khaled Alshehri, Mariola Ndrio, S. Bose, T. Başar\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CISS.2019.8692823\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Distributed energy resources (DERs) have too small supply capacities to directly participate in a wholesale electricity market. In this paper, we study the efficiency of the market, when a collection of DERs are represented by a profit-maximizing aggregator. We model the interaction between the aggregator and the DER owners as a Stackelberg game. Our analysis characterizes the price of aggregation—the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator in representing a collection of DERs as opposed to direct DER participation in the wholesale market.\",\"PeriodicalId\":123696,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 53rd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-03-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 53rd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2019.8692823\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 53rd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CISS.2019.8692823","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Impact of Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources on Electricity Market Efficiency
Distributed energy resources (DERs) have too small supply capacities to directly participate in a wholesale electricity market. In this paper, we study the efficiency of the market, when a collection of DERs are represented by a profit-maximizing aggregator. We model the interaction between the aggregator and the DER owners as a Stackelberg game. Our analysis characterizes the price of aggregation—the efficiency loss due to the strategic incentives of the aggregator in representing a collection of DERs as opposed to direct DER participation in the wholesale market.
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