{"title":"利益相关者导向与管理激励:来自自然实验的证据","authors":"Arthur Petit-Romec","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3340547","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the influence of stakeholder orientation on the design of managerial incentives. Our tests exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors’ duties laws (i.e., state-level laws that explicitly expand board members’ duties to act in the best interests of all stakeholders). We find that the enactment of these laws results in a significant decrease in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the stock price, or delta. The decrease in the delta of CEO compensation is more pronounced for firms with higher board independence and with stronger relationships with stakeholders. Our results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the stock price is an important channel used by boards to internalize stakeholder orientation.","PeriodicalId":171289,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stakeholder Orientation and Managerial Incentives: Evidence From a Natural Experiment\",\"authors\":\"Arthur Petit-Romec\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3340547\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes the influence of stakeholder orientation on the design of managerial incentives. Our tests exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors’ duties laws (i.e., state-level laws that explicitly expand board members’ duties to act in the best interests of all stakeholders). We find that the enactment of these laws results in a significant decrease in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the stock price, or delta. The decrease in the delta of CEO compensation is more pronounced for firms with higher board independence and with stronger relationships with stakeholders. Our results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the stock price is an important channel used by boards to internalize stakeholder orientation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":171289,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340547\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Corporate Governance Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340547","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Stakeholder Orientation and Managerial Incentives: Evidence From a Natural Experiment
This paper analyzes the influence of stakeholder orientation on the design of managerial incentives. Our tests exploit the quasi-natural experiment provided by the staggered adoption of directors’ duties laws (i.e., state-level laws that explicitly expand board members’ duties to act in the best interests of all stakeholders). We find that the enactment of these laws results in a significant decrease in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the stock price, or delta. The decrease in the delta of CEO compensation is more pronounced for firms with higher board independence and with stronger relationships with stakeholders. Our results suggest that the decrease in the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the stock price is an important channel used by boards to internalize stakeholder orientation.
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