内幕交易是欺诈行为

Z. J. Gubler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

联邦内幕交易法在很大程度上是由联邦普通法组成的,它植根于一种禁止与证券买卖有关的欺诈行为的法定制度。长期以来,评论家们一直对这一事实感到遗憾,认为该法律以反欺诈法规为基础是历史上的一个怪癖,没有什么可取之处。毕竟,欺诈与内幕交易有什么关系呢?事实证明,有很多。在本文中,我发展了一个理论来解释和捍卫联邦内幕交易法基于欺诈的本质。具体而言,我认为10b-5规则,即所讨论的反欺诈规则,应被理解为改变了禁止当事人就欺诈责任签订合同的普通法规则。正如合同学者所表明的那样,这种普通法规则阻止了合同当事人有效阻止某些难以察觉的违规行为,内幕交易只是其中一个例子。我认为,规则10b-5与普通法规则相反,允许订约各方就欺诈责任和内幕交易附带的额外补偿性损害赔偿签订合同。这一新内幕交易法理论的意义重大。首先,这个理论帮助我们解释已知的定律,这是其他理论无法做到的。其次,这意味着10b-5规则下的内幕交易责任不应局限于受托人,而应包括至少一些非受托人的交易。第三,这一理论为法院确定10b-5规则的范围提供了一种易于处理的方法——他们必须询问交易者和信息源是否有可能根据10b-5规则承担内幕交易责任,这一调查在一定程度上取决于是否存在欺诈责任的替代方案,以阻止内幕交易。第四,也是最后一点,内幕交易法的合同欺诈理论意味着,在解释这些关于信息的隐性合同时,SEC可以撒下比法院更广泛的责任网。因此,这一理论不仅解释了最高法院的内幕交易判例,也解释了美国证券交易委员会颁布的规则,如10b5-2规则,这些规则被认为超出了法院对法规解释的限制。这一理论意味着SEC完全有权力采用10b5-2规则,这一主张受到了一些联邦法院的质疑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insider Trading As Fraud
Federal insider-trading law consists, for the most part, of federal common law rooted in a statutory regime that prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Commentators have long lamented this fact, viewing the law’s grounding in an anti-fraud statute as a quirk of history with little to recommend it. After all, what does fraud have to do with insider trading? A lot, it turns out. In this article, I develop a theory explaining and defending the fraud-based nature of federal insider trading law. Specifically, I argue that Rule 10b-5, the anti-fraud rule in question, should be understood as altering the common law rule barring parties from contracting for fraud liability. As contract scholars have shown, this common law rule prevents contracting parties from effectively deterring certain hard-to-detect breaches of which insider trading is but one example. Rule 10b-5, I argue, reverses the common law rule, allowing contracting parties to contract for fraud liability and the accompanying extra-compensatory damages for insider trading. The implications of this new theory of insider trading law are significant. First, this theory helps us explain the law as it’s been received, something that competing theories simply can’t do. Second, it implies that insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5 should not be limited to fiduciaries but should include trading by at least some non-fiduciaries as well. Third, this theory provides courts with a tractable way of determining the scope of Rule 10b-5 – they must ask whether the trader and the information source are likely to have contracted for insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5, an inquiry that turns in part on the availability of alternatives to fraud liability for deterring insider trading. Fourth, and finally, the contractual fraud theory of insider trading law implies that, interpreting these implicit contracts over information, the SEC can cast a broader liability net than courts. Consequently, this theory explains not just the Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence but also rules promulgated by the SEC, like rule 10b5-2, which are thought to go beyond the limits of the Court’s interpretation of the statute. This theory implies that the SEC is well within its authority to adopt Rule 10b5-2, a proposition that has been called into question by some federal courts.
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