{"title":"接近可行稳定匹配","authors":"Thành Nguyen, R. Vohra","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764471","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. Our approach is general and applies to other type of complementarities, as well as matchings with side constraints and contracts.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Near Feasible Stable Matchings\",\"authors\":\"Thành Nguyen, R. Vohra\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2764468.2764471\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. Our approach is general and applies to other type of complementarities, as well as matchings with side constraints and contracts.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-06-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764471\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764471","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. Our approach is general and applies to other type of complementarities, as well as matchings with side constraints and contracts.
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