模糊私有信息的定价效应

S. Condie, Jayant V. Ganguli
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引用次数: 26

摘要

当私人信息被模糊性厌恶的投资者观察到时,资产价格在理性预期均衡中可能是信息无效的。这种低效率意味着更低的资产价格,因为不知情的投资者需要溢价来持有资产,并且相对于信息有效的基准而言,回报率波动性更高。此外,资产回报呈负偏态,可能呈细峰态。相对于信息效率高的基准,低效率还会导致新闻中微小变化的价格放大。公开信息影响未公开的私有信息的性质和价格的信息无效率。随着公开信息的好坏,资产价格可能会下降(上升)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Pricing Effects of Ambiguous Private Information
When private information is observed by ambiguity averse investors, asset prices may be informationally inefficient in rational expectations equilibrium. This inefficiency implies lower asset prices as uninformed investors require a premium to hold assets and higher return volatility relative to informationally efficient benchmarks. Moreover, asset returns are negatively skewed and may be leptokurtic. Inefficiency also leads to amplification in price of small changes in news, relative to informationally efficient benchmarks. Public information affects the nature of unrevealed private information and the informational inefficiency of prices. Asset prices may be lower (higher) with good (bad) public information.
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