{"title":"决策与政治","authors":"R. Jervis","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter illustrates how the perceived lessons of Vietnam were in the back of policy makers' minds as they considered the US predicament in Iraq, and notes that this episode demonstrates the power of bureaucracies in shaping information flows and policy options, as well as—paradoxically—of presidents in using their power and persuasion to bring reluctant bureaucracies along. The participants could not avoid remembering the conventional wisdom that the American defeat in Vietnam emboldened adversaries, sowed disunity at home, and crippled the military for years to come. Whether this is an accurate picture can be debated, but not the pervasiveness and power of this narrative within Bush's policy-making team. While there certainly were grounds for believing that for the US to withdraw without having established at least a modicum of order would have had unfortunate consequences for the region, America's reputation, and its self-image, Vietnam may have made it harder to make an unbiased estimate of the likely magnitude of these effects. Vietnam also influenced the way the military fought: the reaction to the war was that it was the kind of conflict the US should never fight again.","PeriodicalId":106766,"journal":{"name":"The Last Card","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decisions and Politics\",\"authors\":\"R. Jervis\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter illustrates how the perceived lessons of Vietnam were in the back of policy makers' minds as they considered the US predicament in Iraq, and notes that this episode demonstrates the power of bureaucracies in shaping information flows and policy options, as well as—paradoxically—of presidents in using their power and persuasion to bring reluctant bureaucracies along. The participants could not avoid remembering the conventional wisdom that the American defeat in Vietnam emboldened adversaries, sowed disunity at home, and crippled the military for years to come. Whether this is an accurate picture can be debated, but not the pervasiveness and power of this narrative within Bush's policy-making team. While there certainly were grounds for believing that for the US to withdraw without having established at least a modicum of order would have had unfortunate consequences for the region, America's reputation, and its self-image, Vietnam may have made it harder to make an unbiased estimate of the likely magnitude of these effects. Vietnam also influenced the way the military fought: the reaction to the war was that it was the kind of conflict the US should never fight again.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106766,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Last Card\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Last Card\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Last Card","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter illustrates how the perceived lessons of Vietnam were in the back of policy makers' minds as they considered the US predicament in Iraq, and notes that this episode demonstrates the power of bureaucracies in shaping information flows and policy options, as well as—paradoxically—of presidents in using their power and persuasion to bring reluctant bureaucracies along. The participants could not avoid remembering the conventional wisdom that the American defeat in Vietnam emboldened adversaries, sowed disunity at home, and crippled the military for years to come. Whether this is an accurate picture can be debated, but not the pervasiveness and power of this narrative within Bush's policy-making team. While there certainly were grounds for believing that for the US to withdraw without having established at least a modicum of order would have had unfortunate consequences for the region, America's reputation, and its self-image, Vietnam may have made it harder to make an unbiased estimate of the likely magnitude of these effects. Vietnam also influenced the way the military fought: the reaction to the war was that it was the kind of conflict the US should never fight again.