{"title":"利用随机博弈论计算攻击者的预期行为","authors":"K. Sallhammar, S. J. Knapskog, B. Helvik","doi":"10.1109/SAINTW.2005.116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents ongoing work on using stochastic game theory as a mathematical tool for computing the expected behavior of attackers. The possible use of the Nash Equilibrium as a part of the transition probabilities in state transition models is defined and motivated. To demonstrate the approach, a simple example of an attack against a computer network is modelled and analyzed.","PeriodicalId":220913,"journal":{"name":"2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT 2005 Workshops)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"77","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Using Stochastic Game Theory to Compute the Expected Behavior of Attackers\",\"authors\":\"K. Sallhammar, S. J. Knapskog, B. Helvik\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SAINTW.2005.116\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents ongoing work on using stochastic game theory as a mathematical tool for computing the expected behavior of attackers. The possible use of the Nash Equilibrium as a part of the transition probabilities in state transition models is defined and motivated. To demonstrate the approach, a simple example of an attack against a computer network is modelled and analyzed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":220913,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT 2005 Workshops)\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-01-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"77\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT 2005 Workshops)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SAINTW.2005.116\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT 2005 Workshops)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SAINTW.2005.116","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Using Stochastic Game Theory to Compute the Expected Behavior of Attackers
This paper presents ongoing work on using stochastic game theory as a mathematical tool for computing the expected behavior of attackers. The possible use of the Nash Equilibrium as a part of the transition probabilities in state transition models is defined and motivated. To demonstrate the approach, a simple example of an attack against a computer network is modelled and analyzed.