一个完全合作的网络

Z.G. Li, S. Xie, Cheng Chen, Y. Soh, C. Wen
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引用次数: 4

摘要

利用广义纳什均衡的新概念设计了一个完全合作网络的收费方案和流量控制方案,该概念基于每个参与者都是明智的,并且打算最小化而不是最大化他/她的预期效用收益(或最大化对手的效用收益)的假设。在我们的方案中,当系统负荷不足时,各环节的价格会提高,当系统负荷过高时,各环节的价格会降低。另一方面,各源的传输速率是价格单调的非递减函数,即价格不下降时各源的传输速率增加,价格下降时各源的传输速率降低。显然,我们的方案不同于现有的基于传统微观经济系统的网络框架。通过我们的方案,网络是和谐的,除了所有的资源相互合作之外,资源和链接也相互合作。这将我们的方案与现有的合作方案区分开来,因为在现有的方案中,只有源之间是相互合作的。在我们的方案中,每个环节都有增加运力的动机,因为这样可以获得更多的利润。这对互联网的发展非常有帮助
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Fully Cooperative Network
A charging scheme and a flow control scheme are designed for a fully cooperative network by using a new concept of generalized Nash equilibrium that is based on an assumption that each player is wise and intends to minimize instead of maximize his/her expected utility payoff (or maximize the opponent's utility payoff). In our scheme, each link will increase its price when the system is under-loaded, and decrease its price when the system is over-loaded. On the other hand, the sending rate of each source is a monotonous non-decreasing function of the price, i.e., each source will increase transmission rate when the price does not fall and decrease transmission rate when the price falls. Clearly, our scheme is different from existing network framework that is based on the conventional microeconomic system. With our scheme, the network is harmonious in the sense that besides all sources cooperate with each other, sources and links are also cooperative with each other. This distinguishes our scheme from existing cooperative scheme in the sense that in the existing schemes, only sources are cooperative with each other. With our scheme, each link has an incentive to increase its capacity because it can get more profit. This is very helpful for the evolution of the Internet
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