{"title":"多家族联合创始人和公司价值","authors":"So-Yeon Lim","doi":"10.22495/ncpr_39","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that higher valuation of family firms occurs only for family firms founded by several non-related people (multi-family cofounding firms). The evidence suggests that having at least two unrelated cofounders involved in management reduces agency problems through mutual monitoring. Relative to single-family founding firms, multi-family cofounding firms are more likely to force out founders and less likely to allow descendants to take control after founders retire","PeriodicalId":352139,"journal":{"name":"New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Multi-family cofounders and firm value\",\"authors\":\"So-Yeon Lim\",\"doi\":\"10.22495/ncpr_39\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The paper shows that higher valuation of family firms occurs only for family firms founded by several non-related people (multi-family cofounding firms). The evidence suggests that having at least two unrelated cofounders involved in management reduces agency problems through mutual monitoring. Relative to single-family founding firms, multi-family cofounding firms are more likely to force out founders and less likely to allow descendants to take control after founders retire\",\"PeriodicalId\":352139,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice\",\"volume\":\"60 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_39\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New challenges in corporate governance: Theory and practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22495/ncpr_39","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper shows that higher valuation of family firms occurs only for family firms founded by several non-related people (multi-family cofounding firms). The evidence suggests that having at least two unrelated cofounders involved in management reduces agency problems through mutual monitoring. Relative to single-family founding firms, multi-family cofounding firms are more likely to force out founders and less likely to allow descendants to take control after founders retire