奖励后挤出的性质和范围:“努力平衡”的解释

Indranil Goswami, Oleg Urminsky
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引用次数: 1

摘要

虽然激励可以成为行为的强大激励因素,但对内在动机的研究表明,奖励可以挤出任务兴趣,在奖励结束时降低参与度。这项研究引起了从业人员和学者对在干预中使用激励措施的广泛怀疑。然而,最近对临时激励的长期影响进行的实地研究并没有发现这种影响。我们提出了一个新的努力平衡理论,该理论认为,奖励后挤出通常代表了在投入努力后需要“休息”,而不是对任务的解释或对自己偏好的信念的改变。因此,奖励后的挤出是相对短暂的,与临时激励的长期中性或积极溢出效应是一致的。我们测试了一系列新颖的预测,包括当努力与奖励更加平衡时(例如,更高的奖励幅度或不那么费力的活动),或者当人们得到休息时,瞬间挤出现象将会减少。讨论了短期挤出对长期行为和激励方案设计的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Nature and Extent of Post-Reward Crowding-Out: The ‘Effort-Balancing’ Account
Although incentives can be a powerful motivator of behavior, research on intrinsic motivation has suggested that rewards can crowd-out task interest, reducing engagement when rewards end. This research has resulted in widespread skepticism among practitioners and academics alike about using incentives in interventions. However, recent field studies examining the long-term effects of temporary incentives have not found such effects. We propose a new Effort-Balancing account, which suggests that post-reward crowding-out often represents the need for a ‘break’ after investing effort, rather than a change in interpretation of the task or beliefs about own preferences. As a result, post-reward crowding-out is relatively momentary and consistent with longer-term neutral or positive spillover effects of temporary incentives. We test a series of novel predictions, including that momentary crowding-out will be reduced when efforts are more balanced by rewards (e.g., higher reward magnitude or a less effortful activity) or when people are given a break. The implications of momentary crowding-out for long-term behavior and design of incentive programs are discussed.
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