基于大数据分析的股利支付和双层股权结构公司

Sai Qiao, Xiaorong Zhu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着大数据时代的到来,面对海量数据,我们可以运用统计方法挖掘数据中隐藏的价值。我的研究表明,股息支付与双层股权之间存在显著的正相关关系,这表明双层股权公司比单层股权公司更有可能支付股息。这一发现与代理理论是一致的,因为代理理论认为股息可以缓解管理者与中小股东之间的代理冲突。我认为这是因为分析师覆盖可以有效地约束管理者的行为,因此分析师覆盖可以作为股利的替代代理控制机制,以缓解管理者与中小股东之间的代理冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dividend payout and dual-class companies based on big data analysis
With the advent of the era of large data, facing massive data, we can apply statistical methods to mining the value hidden in the data.My study shows that there is a positive and significant relation between dividend payout and dual-class shares, suggesting that dual-class firms are more likely to pay dividend than single class firms. The finding is consistent with agency theory since agency theory implies that dividend can be used to mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders. I argue that this is because analyst coverage can effectively discipline the behaviors of managers so that analyst coverage can be used as alternative agency control mechanism of dividend to alleviate agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders.
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