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引用次数: 0
摘要
本章描绘了金融危机期间人们开始对LIBOR失去信心，尤其是在《华尔街日报》的两篇文章之后。监管机构随后展开的调查显示，许多早期预警都被忽视了，而且某些银行至少从2005年起就一直在扭曲利率。根据英国金融服务管理局的报告，本章展示了巴克莱(Barclays)、苏格兰皇家银行(Royal Bank of Scotland)和瑞银(UBS)交易员的日常操纵行为。
This chapter charts the loss of faith in LIBOR that began to set in during the Financial Crisis, particularly following two articles in the Wall Street Journal. Investigation by the regulators subsequently revealed that a number of early warnings had been overlooked, and that certain banks had been distorting rates since at least 2005. Drawing on FSA reports, the chapter demonstrates the day-to-day manipulation practiced by traders at Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS.
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