社会保障、储蓄和财富积累

D. Thornton
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In an essentially equivalent private program, the government could require each covered worker (and/or the employer) to pay into a private investment account 12.4 percent of their taxable income and prevent workers from accessing these accounts until they retired. In the private program, however, workers would own their accumulated contributions and earnings. That is, workers would accumulate wealth. Individuals would thereby have considerable flexibility. They could be given some discretion on how the funds are invested. Moreover, unlike the one-size-fits-all approach of Social Security, individuals could be given considerable discretion as to how the funds would be disbursed upon retirement. Those who were interested in providing their children with opportunities they never had might decide to work longer and pass all or most of their wealth to their heirs. Alternatively, individuals with relatively short life expectancies might opt to retire at the earliest possible date and/or disburse funds more quickly. In the event of an untimely death, the wealth accumulated in their account could be passed to their heirs or given to philanthropic causes. This flexibility could be particularly important to lowand moderateincome earners who may find it difficult to save beyond what they are required to contribute to Social Security. Private accounts would give these earners a greater opportunity to accumulate wealth that they could use at their discretion, which would provide them opportunities not available under the obligatory Social Security annuity. Economists have long known that current consumption and investment—at both the individual and national levels—do not depend so much on current income as on permanent income, which is to say, wealth. It is difficult to estimate how much private wealth accumulation would have differed had Social Security been administered privately rather than publicly. How ever, the Social Security trust fund balance—the accumulated Social Security tax receipts less Social Security payments plus earnings—at the end of 2004 was $1.68 trillion, about two-fifths as large as the federal debt held by the public. Whereas private savings are channeled through financial markets and ultimately lent to individuals, businesses, and governments—state, local, and federal—currently, the Social Security trust funds are not being allocated through competitive financial markets and are not earning a market-determined rate of return. Thus, unlike private saving, Social Security taxes are not directly available to finance private spending and investment. This year’s Social Security tax receipts are used to pay this year’s Social Security benefits. In years when tax receipts are greater than benefits paid, Social Security experiences a surplus. If the surplus were used to reduce the national debt, the funds available for private consumption or investment would be essentially the same as under a private system. This has not been the case, however. Since the early 1980s, Social Security has been running a persistent surplus. Instead of reducing the national debt and, thereby, increasing the pool of funds available for private spending, most often Social Security surpluses have been used to fund “on-budget” deficit spending. This practice has had the effect of making the unified budget deficit smaller than would have been the case had Social Security been privately run. In reporting to Congress recently, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan noted that “[t]he major attraction of personal or private accounts is that they can be constructed to be truly segregated from the unified budget and, therefore, are more likely to induce the federal government to take those actions that would reduce public dissaving and raise national saving.”1 The government would not be able to simply divert Social Security surpluses to cover on-budget deficits. Rather, it would have to compete in financial markets with private investors for private savings. The extent to which fostering private wealth accumulation and increasing the flow of funds into competitive financial markets would promote economic growth or reduce the incentives for government borrowing (and spending) is difficult to say. Never theless, it is clear that the current system diverts funds from competitive financial markets and reduces the control that lowand moderate-income earners have over their retirement funds. Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Future of the Social Security Program and Economics of Retirement, before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, March 15, 2005. Social Security, Saving, and Wealth Accumulation","PeriodicalId":305484,"journal":{"name":"National Economic Trends","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social security, saving, and wealth accumulation\",\"authors\":\"D. Thornton\",\"doi\":\"10.20955/ES.2005.12\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Social Security is a publicly run, mandatory retirement program. A number of analysts have suggested that the program be privatized. 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Private accounts would give these earners a greater opportunity to accumulate wealth that they could use at their discretion, which would provide them opportunities not available under the obligatory Social Security annuity. Economists have long known that current consumption and investment—at both the individual and national levels—do not depend so much on current income as on permanent income, which is to say, wealth. It is difficult to estimate how much private wealth accumulation would have differed had Social Security been administered privately rather than publicly. How ever, the Social Security trust fund balance—the accumulated Social Security tax receipts less Social Security payments plus earnings—at the end of 2004 was $1.68 trillion, about two-fifths as large as the federal debt held by the public. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

社会保障是一项公共管理的强制性退休计划。一些分析人士建议将该项目私有化。我在这里讨论当前的社会保障计划与个人和国家层面的财富积累和储蓄方面有效等效的私人计划之间的区别。根据现行法律,社会保障要求每个参保工人缴纳其应税收入的12.4%(雇员和雇主各缴纳6.2%)。作为回报,那些受社会保障保障的人收到的款项由几个因素决定,包括退休年龄和工作时缴纳的工资税金额。在一个本质上相当的私人计划中,政府可以要求每个受保工人(和/或雇主)将其应税收入的12.4%存入私人投资账户,并禁止工人在退休前使用这些账户。然而,在私人计划中,工人将拥有他们累积的捐款和收入。也就是说,工人会积累财富。因此,个人将有相当大的灵活性。他们可以在如何投资这些资金方面获得一定的自由裁量权。此外,与社会保障的一刀切方法不同,个人在退休后如何支付这些资金方面可以有相当大的自由裁量权。那些有兴趣为子女提供他们从未有过的机会的人可能会决定工作更长时间,并将全部或大部分财富传给他们的继承人。另外,预期寿命相对较短的个人可能会选择尽早退休,并/或更快地支付资金。如果某人英年早逝,他们账户中积累的财富可以传给继承人或用于慈善事业。对于低收入和中等收入者来说,这种灵活性尤其重要,因为他们可能会发现很难存下超过缴纳社会保障所需金额的钱。私人账户将为这些收入者提供更大的机会来积累财富,他们可以自由支配,这将为他们提供强制性社会保障年金所没有的机会。经济学家们早就知道,当前的消费和投资——无论是个人还是国家层面——与其说是依赖于当前收入,不如说是依赖于永久性收入,也就是财富。很难估计,如果社会保障由私人管理而不是由公共管理,私人财富积累会有多大不同。然而,社会保障信托基金的余额——累计的社会保障税收收入减去社会保障支付加上收入——在2004年底是1.68万亿美元,大约是公众持有的联邦债务的五分之二。目前,私人储蓄通过金融市场引导,最终贷给个人、企业和政府(州、地方和联邦),而社会保障信托基金并没有通过竞争性金融市场进行分配,也没有获得由市场决定的回报率。因此,与私人储蓄不同,社会保障税不能直接用于资助私人支出和投资。今年的社会保障税收入用于支付今年的社会保障金。在税收收入大于支付福利的年份,社会保障就会出现盈余。如果盈余被用来减少国家债务,可用于私人消费或投资的资金将基本上与私人制度下相同。然而,事实并非如此。自20世纪80年代初以来,社会保障一直处于盈余状态。社会保障盈余非但没有减少国家债务,从而增加可用于私人支出的资金池,反而经常被用于资助“预算内”赤字支出。这种做法的效果是,统一的预算赤字比社会保障由私人运营的情况下要小。美联储主席格林斯潘最近在向国会报告时指出,“个人或私人账户的主要吸引力在于,它们可以被构建为真正与统一预算分开,因此,更有可能促使联邦政府采取那些将减少公众储蓄和提高国民储蓄的行动。”政府不可能简单地用社会保障盈余来弥补预算赤字。相反,它将不得不在金融市场上与私人投资者争夺私人储蓄。培育私人财富积累和增加资金流入竞争性金融市场,会在多大程度上促进经济增长或减少政府借贷(和支出)的动机,这很难说。 然而,很明显,目前的制度将资金从竞争激烈的金融市场转移,并削弱了中低收入者对其退休基金的控制权。2005年3月15日,美国参议院老龄问题特别委员会,主席艾伦·格林斯潘关于社会保障计划的未来和退休经济的证词。社会保障、储蓄和财富积累
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social security, saving, and wealth accumulation
Social Security is a publicly run, mandatory retirement program. A number of analysts have suggested that the program be privatized. I discuss here the difference between the current Social Security program and an effectively equivalent private program with respect to wealth accumulation and saving at the individual and national levels. Under current law, Social Security requires each covered worker to pay into the program 12.4 percent of their taxable income (6.2 percent each from employee and employer). In return, those covered by Social Security receive payments that are determined by several factors, including age at retirement and the amount of payroll tax contributions made while working. In an essentially equivalent private program, the government could require each covered worker (and/or the employer) to pay into a private investment account 12.4 percent of their taxable income and prevent workers from accessing these accounts until they retired. In the private program, however, workers would own their accumulated contributions and earnings. That is, workers would accumulate wealth. Individuals would thereby have considerable flexibility. They could be given some discretion on how the funds are invested. Moreover, unlike the one-size-fits-all approach of Social Security, individuals could be given considerable discretion as to how the funds would be disbursed upon retirement. Those who were interested in providing their children with opportunities they never had might decide to work longer and pass all or most of their wealth to their heirs. Alternatively, individuals with relatively short life expectancies might opt to retire at the earliest possible date and/or disburse funds more quickly. In the event of an untimely death, the wealth accumulated in their account could be passed to their heirs or given to philanthropic causes. This flexibility could be particularly important to lowand moderateincome earners who may find it difficult to save beyond what they are required to contribute to Social Security. Private accounts would give these earners a greater opportunity to accumulate wealth that they could use at their discretion, which would provide them opportunities not available under the obligatory Social Security annuity. Economists have long known that current consumption and investment—at both the individual and national levels—do not depend so much on current income as on permanent income, which is to say, wealth. It is difficult to estimate how much private wealth accumulation would have differed had Social Security been administered privately rather than publicly. How ever, the Social Security trust fund balance—the accumulated Social Security tax receipts less Social Security payments plus earnings—at the end of 2004 was $1.68 trillion, about two-fifths as large as the federal debt held by the public. Whereas private savings are channeled through financial markets and ultimately lent to individuals, businesses, and governments—state, local, and federal—currently, the Social Security trust funds are not being allocated through competitive financial markets and are not earning a market-determined rate of return. Thus, unlike private saving, Social Security taxes are not directly available to finance private spending and investment. This year’s Social Security tax receipts are used to pay this year’s Social Security benefits. In years when tax receipts are greater than benefits paid, Social Security experiences a surplus. If the surplus were used to reduce the national debt, the funds available for private consumption or investment would be essentially the same as under a private system. This has not been the case, however. Since the early 1980s, Social Security has been running a persistent surplus. Instead of reducing the national debt and, thereby, increasing the pool of funds available for private spending, most often Social Security surpluses have been used to fund “on-budget” deficit spending. This practice has had the effect of making the unified budget deficit smaller than would have been the case had Social Security been privately run. In reporting to Congress recently, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan noted that “[t]he major attraction of personal or private accounts is that they can be constructed to be truly segregated from the unified budget and, therefore, are more likely to induce the federal government to take those actions that would reduce public dissaving and raise national saving.”1 The government would not be able to simply divert Social Security surpluses to cover on-budget deficits. Rather, it would have to compete in financial markets with private investors for private savings. The extent to which fostering private wealth accumulation and increasing the flow of funds into competitive financial markets would promote economic growth or reduce the incentives for government borrowing (and spending) is difficult to say. Never theless, it is clear that the current system diverts funds from competitive financial markets and reduces the control that lowand moderate-income earners have over their retirement funds. Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Future of the Social Security Program and Economics of Retirement, before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, March 15, 2005. Social Security, Saving, and Wealth Accumulation
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