Mahdi Azarafrooz, R. Chandramouli, K.P. Subbalakshmi
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Reciprocity and Fairness in Medium Access Control Games
In wireless communication systems users compete for communication opportunities through a medium access control protocol. Previous research has shown that selfish behavior in medium access games could lead to inefficient and unfair resource allocation. We introduce a new notion of reciprocity in a medium access game and derive the corresponding Fairness Nash equilibrium. Further, using mechanism design we show that this type of reciprocity can remove unfair/inefficient equilibrium solutions.