{"title":"第四章共享注意、共享支持:从二元互动到集体信息","authors":"Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Glenda Satne","doi":"10.1515/9783110647242-005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction, between two agents and one object. When describing the interpersonal dimension of this triangle they frame it as a form of simulation, theorizing or both, involving representations of the other agent ’ s mental states – representation of representations – and inferences. In this paper, we advocate a different framework for understanding shared attention, the ecological psychology framework that understands attention through the notion of ‘ affordance ’ . Affordances are relational and not representational. They are direct relationships between agents and their environments. While some authors have pointed to the notion of ‘ social affordance ’ (Heft 2007, 2017; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Moreira de Carvalho 2020) for understanding phenomena related to shared attention, the notion remains general and imprecise. The problem is that the notion is used indistinctively to refer to a number of different phenomena that involve social attention in very different ways. To address this issue, we offer an initial classification of different kinds of social affordances, from dyadic relations between agents, and different forms of triangular interactions, reciprocal and non-reciprocal, that provide direct and indirect information about common environments to one or both agents, all the way to collective affordances that lie at the basis of socio-cultural forms of life. We argue that this account is better placed than the standard cognitivist alternative to account for both shared attention and joint action in a non-cognitively demanding way. In addition, we show how these forms of shared activity are, in turn, fundamental for the acquisition of the socio-cultural norms that come to permeate human perception. nurturing behavior, economic political","PeriodicalId":202607,"journal":{"name":"Access and Mediation","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Chapter 4 Sharing Attention, Sharing Affordances: From Dyadic Interaction to Collective Information\",\"authors\":\"Miguel Segundo-Ortin, Glenda Satne\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9783110647242-005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction, between two agents and one object. 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引用次数: 4
摘要
共同注意的认知主义方法将其概念化为两个主体和一个客体之间的三角互动形式。当描述这个三角形的人际维度时,他们将其框定为一种模拟、理论化或两者兼而有之的形式,包括对另一个主体心理状态的表征——表征的表征——和推论。在本文中,我们提倡一种不同的框架来理解共同注意,即生态心理学框架,通过“提供性”的概念来理解注意。功能支持是关系性的,而不是代表性的。它们是代理和环境之间的直接关系。虽然一些作者指出了“社会支持”的概念(Heft 2007, 2017;Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014;莫雷拉·德·卡瓦略(Moreira de Carvalho, 2020),以理解与共同关注相关的现象,但这一概念仍然是笼统和不精确的。问题是,这个概念被毫无区别地用于指代许多不同的现象,这些现象以非常不同的方式涉及到社会关注。为了解决这个问题,我们提供了不同类型的社会能力的初步分类,从主体之间的二元关系,到不同形式的三角互动,互惠和非互惠,这些互动为一个或两个主体提供了关于共同环境的直接和间接信息,一直到作为社会文化生活形式基础的集体能力。我们认为,这种说法比标准的认知主义替代说法更能以非认知要求的方式解释共同注意和联合行动。此外,我们还展示了这些形式的共享活动如何反过来成为获得渗透到人类感知中的社会文化规范的基础。培育行为,经济政治
Chapter 4 Sharing Attention, Sharing Affordances: From Dyadic Interaction to Collective Information
: Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction, between two agents and one object. When describing the interpersonal dimension of this triangle they frame it as a form of simulation, theorizing or both, involving representations of the other agent ’ s mental states – representation of representations – and inferences. In this paper, we advocate a different framework for understanding shared attention, the ecological psychology framework that understands attention through the notion of ‘ affordance ’ . Affordances are relational and not representational. They are direct relationships between agents and their environments. While some authors have pointed to the notion of ‘ social affordance ’ (Heft 2007, 2017; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Moreira de Carvalho 2020) for understanding phenomena related to shared attention, the notion remains general and imprecise. The problem is that the notion is used indistinctively to refer to a number of different phenomena that involve social attention in very different ways. To address this issue, we offer an initial classification of different kinds of social affordances, from dyadic relations between agents, and different forms of triangular interactions, reciprocal and non-reciprocal, that provide direct and indirect information about common environments to one or both agents, all the way to collective affordances that lie at the basis of socio-cultural forms of life. We argue that this account is better placed than the standard cognitivist alternative to account for both shared attention and joint action in a non-cognitively demanding way. In addition, we show how these forms of shared activity are, in turn, fundamental for the acquisition of the socio-cultural norms that come to permeate human perception. nurturing behavior, economic political