CVaR准则下具有两个订货机会的协调契约研究

W. Bin, Kejing Zhang
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本研究中,我们分析了一个双层供应链,由一个风险中立的零售商作为Stackelberg的领导者和一个风险厌恶的制造商作为追随者组成。零售商有两次订货机会,制造商必须支付二次订货的缺货罚款。条件风险价值(Conditional Value-at-Risk, CVaR)用来衡量制造商的风险厌恶程度。研究显示了风险态度如何影响供应链成员的最优决策,以及零售商如何向制造商提供激励,以达到双赢的协调结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Research on coordination contract with two ordering opportunities under CVaR criterion
In this study, we analyze a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of one risk neutral retailer as Stackelberg leader and one risk averse manufacture as follower. The retailer has two ordering opportunities and the manufacture has to pay stockout penalty in second order. Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is used to measure the manufacturer's degree of risk aversion. The research shows how the risk attitudes affect the optimal decision of the supply chain members, and how the retailer provide incentives to the manufacture, to reach win-win coordinated result.
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