{"title":"信息流的信念","authors":"Michael R. Clarkson, A. Myers, F. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2005.10","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, a model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.","PeriodicalId":333912,"journal":{"name":"18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"140","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Belief in information flow\",\"authors\":\"Michael R. Clarkson, A. Myers, F. Schneider\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSFW.2005.10\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, a model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":333912,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05)\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-06-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"140\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2005.10\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2005.10","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertainty-based approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, a model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs.