结论

Jody Azzouni
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引用次数: 0

摘要

刽子手/突击检查/预测悖论被解决了。它不能通过否认知识封闭来解决(尽管知识封闭是错误的)。它不能通过否认KK或否认认识p意味着其他迭代的认识态度(尽管这些都是错误的)来解决。通过误导证据导致学生失去知识是解决不了问题的,因为学生不能这样失去知识。解决这个问题的方法是表明一个默认的假设(对学生/囚犯说的话是有信息的)被忽视了,如果忽略了假设,矛盾的推论是无效的。本文探讨了意外考试悖论的现象学,以解释为什么这个解决方案被错过了。关键是,在许多情况下,学生/囚犯知道将会有一个意外的考试/处决,因为老师/法官想说的话的推断,而不是直接通过他所说的话的字面应用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Conclusion
The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that knowing p implies other iterated knowing attitudes (although these are false). It is not solved by misleading evidence causing the students to lose knowledge because students cannot lose knowledge this way. It is solved by showing that a tacit assumption (what is being said to the students/prisoner is informative) is overlooked and that inferences by contradiction are invalid if assumptions are left out. The phenomenology of the surprise-exam paradox is explored to explain why this solution has been missed. Crucial is that in many cases the students/prisoner know(s) there will be a surprise exam/execution because of an inference from what the teacher/judge meant to say, and not directly by the literal application of what he did say.
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