利率下限不确定下的稳健货币政策

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics Pub Date : 2020-07-29 DOI:10.1515/bejm-2019-0077

Peter Tillmann

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引用次数: 2

摘要

中央银行面临着名义利率有效下限(ELB)真实位置的不确定性。在流动性陷阱中，当中央银行设计的政策相对于ELB的位置是稳健的时，我们建立了最优可自由支配货币政策的模型。如果央行担心ELB的最坏情况，那么在流动性陷阱出现之前的一段时间里，货币环境将更具扩张性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Robust Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty About the Lower Bound

Abstract Central banks face uncertainty about the true location of the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates. We model optimal discretionary monetary policy during a liquidity trap when the central bank designs policy that is robust with respect to the location of the ELB. If the central bank fears the worst-case location of the ELB, monetary conditions will be more expansionary in the period before the liquidity trap.

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The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics

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