基于仿真的工业厂房网络安全攻击实时识别

A. Patel, T. Schenk, S. Knorn, H. Patzlaff, D. Obradovic, Andrés Botero Halblaub
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文考虑了针对工业工厂的网络攻击问题,并提出了使用数字孪生来检测和定位此类攻击的方法。数字孪生由标称植物行为的表示组成,即不受攻击,为此可以使用微分代数方程系统或离散状态模型。通过在线模拟系统的名义行为,即与进程并行,并不断将模拟行为与测量值进行比较,可以检测到攻击。他们的定位是通过根本原因分析,这也是基于植物的模型描述。这个概念已经在一个小规模的工业原型上实现和测试了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Real-time, Simulation-based Identification of Cyber-Security Attacks of Industrial Plants
This paper considers the problem of cyber attacks onto industrial plants and proposes to use a digital twin to detect and localize such attacks. The digital twin consists of a representation of the nominal plant behavior, i.e., not under attack, for which differential-algebraic equation systems or discrete state models may be used. By simulating the nominal behavior of the system online, i.e., in parallel to the process, and continuously comparing the simulated behavior to the measured values allows to detect attacks. Their localization is facilitated through a root-cause analysis, which is also based on the model description of the plant. The concept has been implemented and tested on a small scale industrial prototype.
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