苏格拉底的反伦理学:柏拉图对亚里士多德

I. Protopopova
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摘要

本文的目的是在柏拉图和亚里士多德对善的理解的背景下,比较柏拉图的苏格拉底和亚里士多德的伦理学。第一部分分析亚里士多德对伦理学的理解。他的出发点是,善本身是没有的,善是有很多的。亚里士多德认为,最高的善是城邦的善;他的道德是由政治决定的。最大的幸福是按照美德生活;道德的(伦理的)美德(ρετ ο ο θικ κ)可以通过暗示和重复某些行为来传授;德行的本质是与中道相联系的,为了养成坚持中道的习惯,必须避免激情和行动的过度和缺乏。第二部分论证了亚里士多德和柏拉图的美德概念之间的差异。对柏拉图来说,主要的是善的本身,它是超越存在的(ο π α τ ο ς σ),但同时它也是一切事物的原因,是可认知的事物和认知本身(R. 509b6-10)。因此,城邦的善对他来说绝不是最高的善;一般来说,城邦和政治只是所谓可见存在领域的一个层面,在那里由意见支配。既然善本身超越了存在的极限,一个为之奋斗的人就必须超越存在的极限,超越他自己的极限,这种超越在《会饮篇》,《费德鲁斯篇》,《斐多篇》中都有描述;在《会饮篇》中,强调只有这种超越才能产生真正的美德,而不仅仅是它的幽灵。因此,在柏拉图看来,美德决不可能是中间的,也不可能教美德;正是在这个意义上,柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底的观点才可称为反伦理(柏拉图笔下根本不存在“伦理”这个词)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Anti-Ethics of Socrates: Plato versus Aristotle
The purpose of this article is to compare the ethics that can be found in Plato’s Socrates with the ethics of Aristotle in the context of Plato’s and Aristotle’s understanding of the good. The first part analyzes Aristotle’s understanding of ethics. He proceeds from the fact that there is no good in itself, there are many of them. The highest good, according to Aristotle, is the good of polis; his ethics is determined by politics. The highest happiness is to live according to virtue; moral (ethical) virtue (ἀρετὴ ἠθικὴ) can be taught by suggestion and repetition of certain actions; the nature of virtue is connected with the middle, it is necessary to avoid both excess and lack of passions and actions in order to acquire the habit of sticking to the middle. The second part demonstrates the difference between Aristotelian and Platonic concepts of virtue. For Plato, the main thing is the good in itself, which is beyond being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), but at the same time it is the cause of all things, the cognizable and cognition as such (R. 509b6–10). Accordingly, the good of polis for him is by no means the topmost good; in general, polis and politics are only one of the levels of the so-called visible realm of existence, where opinion rules. Since the good itself goes beyond the limits of existence, a person striving for it must go beyond the limits of existence, and his own self: such transcendence is described in the dialogues “Symposium”, “Phaedrus”, “Phaedo”; in the “Symposium”, it is emphasized that only this transcendence allows to give birth to a genuine virtue, and not merely a ghost of it. Thus, virtue according to Plato can in no way be the middle, and it is also impossible to teach it; it is in this sense that the views of Plato’s Socrates may be called anti-ethics (the word “ethics” in Plato does not exist at all).
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